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Summary findings
In recent years, private capital infl-nws  to some  Republic.  of Korea,  and Thailand), and discuss  how these
developing  countries have increased  sharply.  This  countries have dealt with the macroeconomic  side effects
increase  has provided the financing  needed to enhance  of capital inflows.  Among  their findings:
the use of existing  capacity  and to raise  investment levels.  - All  nine countries have avoided a permanent,
But capital inflows produce their own problems.  They  significant  increase  in inflation, it can be argued. In
can increase  inflation and lead to exchange rate  Argentina and Mexico  inflation has been decreasing  for
appreciation, for example.  three or four years, and in the other seven countries it
Corbo and Hernandez review  the macroeconomic  has remained stable.
repercussions  of an increase  in capital inflows.  Generally,  *  The countries that received the largest  average
it will result in appreciation of the real exchange  rate, a  capital inflows (as  a proportion of GDP)  in 1989-92 are
larger  nontradable sector, a smaller tradable sector, and a  not those that experienced  the greatest exchange  rate
larger trade deficit.  appreciation.  In fact, the countries  with the greatest
Under  a fLxed  exchange  rate regime, ir will also result  capital inflows (Chile,  Malaysia,  and Thailand) have
in faster inflation and an accumulation  of foreign  experienced  cither depreciation or low appreciation of
reserves.  their currencies.  (Appreciation  was lower in Thailand
Can government  intervention minimize  the size and  than in Korea  despite much greater capital inflows  in
effects  of real exchange  rate appreciation? Corbo  and  Thailand.)
Hernindez discuss  different mechanisms  that can be used  * Countries with decreasing  govermnent  consumption
to limit that appreciation  - and discuss  the difference, in  as a percentage  of GDP (Chile,  Indonesia,  and Malaysia)
this respect, between porrfolio investment  and external  showed less  appreciation of the real exchange  rate.
debL  - Countries with increasing  government  consumption
Finally,  they review and compare the recent  as a percentage  of GDP (Argentina,  Korea,  Mexico, and
exppeiences  of four Latin American  countries (Argentina,  the Philippines)  showed  the greatest appreciation of the
Chile, Colombia,  and Mexico) and five East  Asian  real exchange  rate, despite not receiving  the greatest
countries (Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the Philippincs,  the  capital inflows.
This paper - a product of the International Finance  Division,  Intemational Economics  Department  - is part of a larger
effort in the department to analyze  the consequences  for developing  countries of the new surge in capital inflows.  Copies
of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H StreetNW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Rose  Vo,
room S8-113,  extension 31047 (35 pages).  November 1994.
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Summary
In recent years, capital inflows to some developing countries have increased sharply. These have
provided much needed financing to increase the use of existing capacity and to increase investment
levels. However, capital inflows can have their own problems as they will result in an increase in
domestic expenditures,  and therefore, in a real exchange rate appreciation,  a larger non-tradable  sector,
a smaller tradable sector, and ultimately  in a larger trade deficit.  In addition, in a fixed or preannounced
nominal exchange rate regime they will also result in an acceleration of domestic inflation and in an
accumulation  of foreign reserves.
Governments  in developing  countries should be concerned about capital inflows because of several
reasons. Among those the most important are: first, the increase in the volume of resources being
intermediated  through  the financial system, which can exacerbate  moral hazard problems, especially.  in
countries  with a weak banks' supervisory  system; second,  the appreciation  of the real exchange rate can
put in jeopardy the success of the recently implemented  trade libealization reforms; third, the increase
in  domestic inflation can erode the credibility of the undergoing price stabilization programs; and
fourth, if capital inflows are volatfle and of a short-term nature, a reversal of the flows may cause
important  economic  losses associated  with the resource reallocation  process.
In order to minimize the side effects of capital inflows, govermnents can intervene by  directly
restricting the amount of inflows, restraining fiscal policy, liberalizing the current account and the
capital account of  the balance of  payments -in  particular capital outflows-,  intervening in  the
exchange market to support the nominal exchange rate, implementing open miarket  operations to curb
the increase in domestic liquidity, and by increasing the exchange-risk faced by participants in the
market
This paper reviews and compares the  recent experiences of four Latin American countries -
Argenfina,  Chile, Colombia and Mexico- and five East Asian countries -Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand- that have received capital inflows in recent years, and discusses how
they have dealt with the macroeconomic  side effects of capital inflows. The major findings  of the paper
are the following:
- First, it can be argued that all the countries in the sample have been successful in avoiding a
permanent  and significant  increase  in inflation.
- Second, while  Chile, Indonesia, and  Malaysia have  avoided a  significant real  exchange rate
appreciation,  Argentina, Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines  have had a strong appreciation of the real
exchange  rate. Thailand lies in betwieen  these two groups.
- Third, the countries that have received the  largest capital inflows (as a percentage of GDP) on
average  during 1989-92,  are not those that have experienced  the largest real exchange  rate appreciation,
implying that  the  application of  different economic policies may  have  helped  to  contain the
appreciation  of the real exchange  rate, in spite of receiving  significant  capital inflows.- Fourth, those countries that show a decreasing  pattern of government  consumption  -as a percentage
of GDP- are also those that show a lower real exchange rate appreciation, while those countries that
show an increasing  share of govermnent  consumption in GDP are the same that show the highest real
exchange  rate appreciation.
- Fifth, it could be argued that, with the exception of Chile in Latin America and Korea' and the
Philippines  in East Asia, countries in the latter region have tended to rely more on a restrictive fiscal
policy than countries  in Latin America to counteract the macroeconomic  effects of the recent surge of
capital inflows.
- Sixth, sterilized  intervention  is most effective  when it is accompanied  by fiscal restraint However,  it
does not seem to be a sustainable  policy in ihe long-mn as sterilized intervention tends to exacerbate
capital inflows rather than to ameliorate them. This occurs because it tends to increase the.  differential
between domestic and foreign interest rates. Furthermore, steilized  intervention worsens the quasi
fiscal deficit of the Cental  Bank.
- Seventh, an increase in public sector savings seems to be the only sustainable  policy to.  protect the
real exchange rate in the  long run and seems to be perceived more favorably by the international
investors  community. However, a mixed fiscal-monetary  policy seems to be more appropriate in the
short run than pure fiscal policy. This occurs because fiscal policy usually lacks the required flexibility
to deal with volatile capital flows in the short run.
Although these conclusions  are drawn from the analysis  of only nine developing countries  -selected
among the major recipients  of capital inflows in recent years-, most likely the economic  policy lessons
that result from these expenences can also be  -applied  to any low- or middle-income  country that starts
experencing a  sudden increase in the flow of foreign exchange. This surge in the flow of foreign
exchange  may result either from a surplus in the capital account  or in the current  account.MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT TO CAPITAL INFLOWS:
LATIN AMERICAN STYLE VERSUS EAST ASIAN STYLE
1.  Introduction
The debt crisis of 1982 was precipitated  by a sudden reduction in capital inflows at a time when
highly indebted developing  countries were facing a slow down of the world economy, a large increase
in  intemational interest rates, and a  sharp loss in  terms  of trade. Weak economic policies and
institutions exacerbated the effects of these shocks. Under these circumstances,  the sharp cut-off of
capital inflows forced a quick and sharp increase in the size of the required net external transfer. In the
short run, the increase ir! the extemal transfer took the form of a sharp reduction of imports with
negative effects  on econonuc activity, investment  rates and future growth.
After the initial shock, most highly indebted countries  were.  occupied during the rest of the decade
adjusting policies and institutions to the new scenario of extremely restricted availability of extenal
financing.  This adjustment  process was intended  to restore a sustainable  balance of payments situation,
while creating  the basis for sustainable  growth. Some countries had even the expectation  of an eventual
return to international  capital markets, but this time, to reduce their exposure to exteral  shocks, they
wanted  to rely less on debt and more on direct  foreign investment  and portfolio investment.
In the initial years following the debt crisis, most of the lending to developing countries took the
form of official lending from Iteratonal  Financial Institutions. This lending supported reforms of
policies and institutions  to create the appropriate conditions  to reestablish.the  macroeconomic  balances
and to lay the foundations  for sustainable  growth.
In recent years, private capital inflows towards countries that have advanced in their adjustment
efforts  have incrased  sharply.  In fact the Capiial  Account Surplus  (including  net errors and omissions)
for all developing  countries incrcased from 74.9 billion doLars in 1987, to 83.3 billion dollars  in 1990
and further to 146 billion dollars in 1991 and 1992.1 The repatriation  of the capital that had flown out
of these countries in the early 1980s has financed part of these capital inflows. These inflows have
taken the  form of a  combination of commercial lending from banks and suppliers, direct foreign
investment, and portfolio capital. For the case of portfolio investment  the interest has arisen from the
possibility of providing risk capital financing for the expansion of the private sector. This type of
inflow increased from 6.2 billion dollars in  1987 to 37.2 billion dollars in  1992, and reached 26.9
billion doUlars  in the first half of 1993 alone. 2 However,  there has also been much interest in attracting
direct foreign investment as this type of inflow comes with access to new technologies and markets.
These  flows have been  encouraged by the  host  countnes through a  combination of  removal of
restrictions,  and better prospects as a result of the macroeconomic  reforms.
The increase in capital. inflows is beneficial for the host countries because it relaxes the severe
financial  constraint that they faced during much of the 1980s. Also, this new wave of capital inflows is
different from the capital inflows that occurred in the late 1970's and early 1980's, because now the
resources are going to the private sector and predominantly in the  form of equity rather than debt
financing.
I  World  Economic  Outlook,  IMF, May 1993.
2  Sudarshan  Gooptu (1993) and John Williamson  (1993).
1With the debt crisis so close in time, it appears  paradoxical  that in the early 1  990s there is a problem
of receiving "too much" capital. Nevertheless,  the increase  in capital inflows to developing  countries is
a matter of concern because of the macroeconomic  and other related effects in the recipient countries.
Indeed, capital inflows could potentially be a problem if they are of a short term nature and highly
volatile. This type of inflows, also called hot money, is usually attracted  by some imperfections  or
policy mistakes that create a large gap between domestic and expected devaluation-augmented  foreign
interest rates.  This type of inflows could create undue instability in inflation rates and in the nominal
and real exchange rates.  If there are imperfections  in capital markets and hysterisis type of effects in
the  export and import competing sectors, or  real  bankruptcy and  reallocation costs, then these
fluctuations  could have important economic  costs.
Not surprisingly,  in many countries the economic  authorities try to discourage hot money by lifting
the imperfections  that encourage them in the first place, or by controlling the side effects of capital
inflows through different types of govermnent  intervention. Capital inflows of a more cyclical variety
could also create cycjical  fluctuations  in the real exchange rate. The latter could create difficulties to
the tradable sectors and to the overall macroeconomic  management. This type of flows creates troubles
similar to the traditional  Dutch disease problem of a mineral  discovery.
In this paper we first review the macroeconomic  and other related effects of capital inflows. Second,
we try to  clarify the  paradox mentioned above and discuss the  reasons why a country could be
concerned about receiving "too much" capital inflows. Third, we analyze the  different economic
policies that countries can use to deal with the side effects of capital inflows. 3 Fourth, we study the
actual way in which nine different developing  countries,  four Latin American and five East Asian, have
dealt with capital inflows in  recent years. Finally, by comparing the actual experiencies of these
countries, we draw some conclusions  on how to manage capital inflows in order to minimize some of
their side effects.
2.  The Macroeconomic  and Other Related  Effects of Capital Inflows
2.1  The Macroeconomics  of Capital Inflows
Capital inflows, by permiting a relaxation of the liquidity constraint facing recipient countries,  may
reduce domestic interest rates, and result in an increase in the level of domestic expenditures. The
increase in private and public expenditures  put in motion a price adjustment  process. For the purpose of
the analysis suppose that the country produces and consumes three goods: an exportable good, an
importable good, and a non-tradable  good. Assuming  that the terms of trade between the importable and
the exportable goods are fixed, these two goods can be grouped into just  one good that we call
tradable. Following  the expenditure  increase (made  possible by the capital inflow) and given a pattem
of demand-for  these two types of goods, part of the increase in expenditures  will go into tradable goods
and part into non-tradable  goods The increase in expenditures  on tradable goods will increase the size
of the trade deficit and in this way will help to accommodate  directly the capital  inflow. If this were all,
the adjustment would be easy. The only concern about capital inflows would be on the sustainability  of
the inflow and on the solvency  of the country.
3  Those readers who are familiar with  the theoretical aspects of our discussion  can skip sections 2, 3 and 4, in particular
sub-sections  2.1 and 32.
2However, this is not all. The increase in the demand for non-tradable  goods creates, at the existing
relative price between tradable and non-tradable  goods, an excess demand for non-tradables.  The excess
demand for non-tradables  will result -independently of the exchange  rate regime-- in an increase in the
relative price of  non-tradable goods; that is, an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  The real
exchange rate appreciation will, in turn, create incentives for the reallocation of factors from the
tradable to the non-tradable sector, and for a switching of expenditures from non-tradable towards
tradable goods. The final result is a real appreciation, a larger non-tradable sector, a smaller tradable
sector, and a larger trade balance  deficit. The real appreciation  will occur either through an appreciation
of the nominal exchange rate (under a floating exchange rate system), or through an increase in the
nominal  price of the non-tradable  good (in a fixed or preannounced  exchange  rate system) 4
The real appreciation is the price mechanism at work. The increase in domestic expenditures,  made
possible by the initial capital inflow, puts the whole process in motion, and together with the real
appreciation and the demand and supply characteristics  for both types of goods, determines the final
size of the trade balance deficit. This is the standard macroeconomics of the transfer problem.  The
same sort of process will be set in motion by an increase in short-term  borrowing,  an increase in official
capital, or an increase in direct foreign investment However,  the latter two types of capital inflows are
much less reversible and therefore the real appreciation will be much less volatile.  But still the
economic authorities may want to  smooth the evolution of the real exchange rate.  Also a similar
adjustment  process would result from a mineral discovery  or a permanent  increase in the terms of trade.
The only difference  is that in the latter case the export good that benefits from the increase in price will
end up with an increase in production, while the rest of the tradable sector will lose resources to the
expanding  export good and to the non-tradable  sector. This is the well known "Dutch disease  problem"
analyzed  by Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984)-
2.2  Other Side Effects of Capital Inflows
There are two other effects related to  an increase in capital inflows. First, the larger amount of
capital brought into the country will increase the volume of funds being intermediated  through the
domestic capital markets, and, therefore, will cause an expansion in the volume of domestic financial
assets and liabilities. Second, in a fixed or predetermined  exchange rate system, the monetization of
large capital inflows will have an inflationary  effect through  the price of the non-tradable  goods.
3.  Why should a government be concerned about the increase in capital inflows?
3.1  The General Case
There are several reasons why recipient countries are usually concerned about a large increase in
capital inflows.
First, for those countries with a weak supervision of their financial system, the larger amount of
funds being intermediated  may exacerbate  moral hazard problems,  and result in a financial  bubble that
could eventually lead to a financial  crisis.
Second,  in countries that have recently reformed  their trade policies improving their integration into
the world economy, the real exchange rate appreciation that is required for the transfer to take place
4  The dynamics of an economy with a floating exchange  rate system is different  from the one explained  in this  section,
but the final result of a real exchange  raze  appreciation  remains.  See  Dombush (1976) and Calvo and Rodriguez  (1  977).
3may erode the profitability  of the trade-oriented  sectors and, therefore, put in jeopardy the undergoing
trade reform. Reforming the trade regime to reduce the discrimination against exports entails tariff
reforms,  and an initial real depreciation  accompanied  from there on by a fairly stable real exchange  rate
adjusted for fundamentals  (Thomas et. al. 1990). For countries that have initiated a trade reform, the
real appreciation that goes with  the higher expenditures could work at cross  purposes with  the
liberalization  of trade, and could eventually result in a loss of credibility on the sustainability of the
reforms.  The main concern here is on cyclical capital inflows that would result in a real exchange rate
misalignment,  with important real costs. These costs will persist even after the reversal of the initial
misalignment.
Third, in countries that are pursuing a stabilization  program with a fixed or preannounced  nominal
exchange rate  as  an  anchor for  domestic prices, tie  authorities could  be  concemed about the
monetization  effects of large capital inflows and their lack of control on monetary policy. In a fixed
exchange rate system with an open capital account and with domestic assets that are close substitutes
for foreign assets, the effectiveness  of monetary policy is severely impaired (Mundell, 1968). In this
setting  the expansion in high powered money caused  by the larger capital inflows will have inflationary
effects through  the price of the non-tradable  goods. 5
Fourth, if capital inflows are volatile and/or of a temporary  type, the reversibility of flows can have
real adjustment costs that occur because of resource reallocation costs, bankruptcies, price rigidities,
hysterisis  or other market imperfections.  If the capital inflows are considered  to have a large temporary
component,  the country will try to avoid to go through a whole adjustment  process to be reversed later
on.  Reversing an initial adjustment could be quite costly if there are irreversible costs involved.
Related  to this, for those countries with a more flexible exchange  rate system, the capital inflows could
be the source of excessive volatility in the nominal and real exchange rate. This is particularly relevant
in the case of hot money.
Fifth, there always exists the concern about maintaining a sustainable Current Account Deficit over
GDP ratio in  the long run.  A too sudden increase in this ratio, specially if  due to  a  domestic
consumption boom, could raise the country's risk premium as well as restrict its future access to
international  capital markets.
Finally,  there is a political economy  argument.  In many countries  the governnuent  could be subject to
strong  political pressure from interest groups in the exporting and import-competing  sectors,  in order to
avoid or to  limit the size of the real exchange rate appreciation that could result from the capital
inflows  In this case, many governments  are forced to undertake "exchange  rate protection" actions.
3.2  What is different about Portfolio Investment?
In the previous section we briefly discussed the potential macroeconomic problems created by
capital inflows. However, the previous discussion applies to capital inflows in general as we did not
make any distinction among the different types of  capital inflows. In this section we look at the
particular features  of portfolio investment and the specific  macro  problems  related to them
5  Assuming  that the increase  in money  supply is larger  than the increase  in money demand.-
43.2.1 Volatility
The most outstanding feature of portfolio investment,  as opposed to other forms of capital inflows
-such as direct foreign investment, borrowing from intemational financial institutions,  or long term
bank loans-  is that they present a potential risk of a reversal of flows in a very short term; i.e., the
possibility that foreign investors may suddenly decide to leave the country they are investing in. This
potential risk of flow-reversal  is only comparable  to the case of short term bank loans (hot mnoney)  and
may be very harmful in terms of either a greater exchange rate volatility or a greater interest rate
volatility, or both. Furthermore,  if the Central Bank lacks the necessary  speed of reaction and the stock
of international  reserves is at a low level,  it may cause  a balance of payments crisis. 6
A negative shock --such as a disappointing  political  development,  a decrease  in the price of the main
exportable  good, an increase  in the price of the main importable good, or a change in taxes affecting  the
returns from these inflows-- may induce foreign investors to take their money out of the country.
Alternatively,  they will be willing to keep their investment in place only if a higher return is provided.
In both cases they will react by selling their domestic stock holdings and, with the proceeds,  will buy
foreign currency.  This will (initially) cause a fall in the general stock price index and, depending on the
exchange rate system, either an increase in domestic interest rates or a depreciation of the exchange
rate, or both.
Under a floating exchange rate system, and if domestic assets are perfect substitutes for foreign
assets, a large increase (with overshooting)  in the price of the foreign exchange will occur. The actual
depreciation of the domestic cunrency  will be such that its future expected appreciation (given the
overshooting) will  exactly compensate foreign investors for the  difference between the  domestic
interest rates (that stay at the same initial level) and the higher interest rates they demrand  after the
negative shock occurs. 7
Under a fixed exchange rate system, and again assuming perfect substitution between foreign and
domestic assets, domestic stock prices will fall, the level of intemational reserves at the Central Bank
will fall, and domestic interest rates will rise as domestic liquidity (i.e., the stock of nominal money)
falls.
Alternatively,  if a favorable shock occurs such that foreign investors want to invest more in the host
country, stock prices will increase, and depending  on the exchange  rate regime either domestic interest
rates will drop and the stock of money will increase (under a fixed exchange rate system), or the
exchange rate will appreciate up  to  a point where the  expected depreciation compensate foreign
investors for the lower expected return they demand after the favorable shock occurs (under a floating
exchange rate system).
If foreign and domestic assets (i.e., stocks) are not perfect substitutes, then domestic interest rates
may  differ from the  expected depreciation-augmented  foreign interest rates.  In  such  a  case the
adjustment in interest rates (under a fixed exchange rate system) or in the exchange rate (under a
floating exchange  rate system) will be less severe, although it will follow the same pattern. Thus, if a
negative shock occurs in a floating exchange rate system, stock prices will fall and domestic interest
6  It is important  to note that, on an empirical  basis, there is no conclusive evidence conceming the different degree of
volatility  of the different  sources  of extemal  financing.  See Claessens  et. al. (1993).
7  In the analysis we are assuming  that domestic  prices do not adjust immediately,  i.e., that commodity  markets adjust
slower  than asset markets.  See Dombusch  (1976)  and Calvo and Rodrfguez  (1977).
5rates will increase  (under  perfect  substitution  domestic  interest  rates remain  constant).  Therefore  the
exchange  rate will overshoot  less than in the perfect  substitution  case. Under a fixed exchange  rate
system  the same  negative  shock  will cause a smaller increase  in domestic  interest  rates  in the case of
imperfect  asset  substitution  than in the case of perfect asset  substitution. 8
All these  price  movements  can  be an important  source  of uncertainty  that restrain  investors  (foreign
and domestic)  from  investing,  and, at the same  time,  they can be very damaging  for the economy  as a
whole  if the fluctuations  in interest  rates  or exchange  rates  are too wide.  The loss  for  the economy  as a
whole occurs  because  of bankruptcies  and hysterisis  effects  when interest rates increase  and/or the
exchange  rate appreciates  (the  latter  applies  only  for  the exporting  and import-competing  sectors).
In order  to avoid all these adverse  price movements  the authority  will have  to intervene,  either  by
trading  foreign  currency  in a floating  exchange  rate system,  or dtrough  sterilization  in the case of a
fixed  exchange  rate. Either  way the Central  Bank  will be, somehow,  making  the functioning  of both
exchange  rate  regimes  very  similar. 9
3.2.2 Portfolio  Irvestment and Macroeconomic  Fluctuations
Another  important  characteristic  of portfolio  investment,  as opposed  to other forms  of capital  flows
such  as bank loans,  is its behavior  during  the different  phases  of the macroeconomic  cycle.  In fact it has
been  argued  that bank  borrowing  exacerbates  the cycle  because  of its pro-cyclical  pattern,  i.e.,  banks  are
willing  to lend  more during  the expansionary  and recovery  phases  of the cycle  than during  recessions.
However,  because  portfolio  investmnent  implies  that private gains and losses occur whenever  stock
prices  fluctuate,  private  investors  will  restrain  from  selling  (or  buying)  every  time  stock  prices  are "too"
low (or "too"  high),  i.e.,  they will  try to avoid  the realization  of capital  losses.  This  behavior  will result
in an endogenous  smoothing  mechanism  of the cycle. Of course  this reasoning  applies  only when
domestic  and  foreign  assets  are not  perfect  substitutes.
4.  What can be done to deal  with the side  effects  of capital  inflows?
Many  countries  have  tried in recent  years  to gain access  to international  capital  flows  while,  at the
same time, protecting the  macroeconomic  situation from a  large real appreciation  and/or an
acceleration  of inflation.  To deal  with  these  potential  problems  caused  by capital  inflows,  countries  can
use  either  indirect  methods,  direct  methods,  or both.
4.1  Direct  Methods
If capital inflows, due to their size or composition,  are considered  to create macroeconomic
problems of  the  type discussed above, and they are  motivated by  imperfections  or  policy
inconsistencies  in the domestic  financial  markets,  countries  may  try to elimninate  the distortion  that is
causing  the capital  inflow.  The type of distortion  that encourage  short-term  capital  inflows  are, for
example,  keeping  a high domestic  interest  rate, while at the same time offering  free currency  risk
B  It is important  to note  that  only in  the case  when  substitution  between  foreign'  and  domestic  assets  is less  than  'perfect  is
it possible  for  the Central  Bank  to sterilize  capital  inflows.  This  will  show  to be important  later  on when  we discuss  the
actual  country  cases.
9  Although  it is not clear that  the govemment  is better  able  to disdnguish  pennanent  from  transitory  capital  movements
(i.e.,  shocks)  than  is the private  sector,  the evidence  firn  developed  countries  for  the  past decades  suggests  that  there  is
a need  for  govemments  to attempt  to stabilize  real  and  nominal  exchange  rates.
6protection through a swap facility at the Central Bank. 10 Also, offering free deposit insurance at
domestic  commercial  banks,  along with a-high  domestic  interest rate and a fixed nominal  exchange  rate
may cause  an increase  in capital inflows.
Short term speculative  capital inflows (hot money) could also result from a restrictive monetary
policy  that accompany  an expansionary  fiscal policy. In the latter  case  changing  the policy mix towards
a more restrictive fiscal policy and a less restrictive monetary policy, by reducing  domestic interest
rates to a level closer  to the sum of international  interest rates and the expected  rate of devaluation,  i.e.,
getting closer to the interest rte  parity condition,  reduces  the incentives  for capital  inflows of the type
that respond mainly to interest rate differentials  and/or to the expectation  of a future drop in domestic
interest  rates, that is, bank loans  and portfolio  investment.
If the ultimate  cause of the increase  in capital inflows could not be dealt with, and the country is
concerned  with the macroeconomic  effects  of capital inflows,  it could try direct  methods to control  the
size of them. Direct  methods  consist of imposing  restictions on capital  inflows  in order  to reduce  their
amount. Measures  include ceilings on foreign boirowing, minimmn  reserve requirements  on foreign
loans, ceilings  on foreign  direct investment,  etc. The authorities  could also try to reduce  the size of the
inflows through taxation of the flows through  a Tobin's interest rate equalization  tax. This measure
works only in the short run as it is very difficult  to have effective  ways to control  capital flows in the
long run (see  Mathieson  and Rojas, 1993,  and Schadler  et. al., 1993).
4.2  Indirect Methods
Indirect  methods  comprise  the following:
Intrvention,  i.e., the purchase of foreign currency by the Central Bank in order to support the
nominal  exchange  rate. This can be of two types: steilized and non-sterilized.  In the case of sterilized
intervention  the Central  Bank  also carries  out open  market operations  to mop up the liquidity  created  by
the initial purchase of foreign exchange. The sterilization could also be done by  imposing other
restictions that work through  a reduction  in the money multiplier  -such as an increase  in commercial-
bank's required reserves  or a ceiling in total commercial  banl's credit- which also helps to avoid the
monetization  effect  of the purchase  of foreign  currency  Qi.e.,  limits the increase  in the money supply).
However,  the room in this area is limited by the degree of substitution  between foreign and domestic
assets. In a fixed exchange rate or preannounced  nominal exchange rate regime  "tablita"),  the more
open is the capital  account  and the higher is the degree of substitution  between domestic and foreign
assets,  the less effective  is this policy. 11 Also  this policy usually  increases  the quasi  fiscal deficit  of the
Central  Bank.
In countries  with a level of output close to the potential  output,  non-sterilized  intervention  is usually
implemented  with another  policy  to restrain  aggregate  demand.
*  Fiscal Adjustment A restrictive fiscal policy is intended  to have a macro effect and a composition
effect The first effect  (ceterisparibus)  attempts  to counteract  for the increase  in aggregate  demand  that
is created  by the capital  inflows. The second effect  (again, ceteris  paribus) helps  to keep a higher real
10  This  happened,  for example,  in Chile in 1990.  See the country  analysis  below-
1  For a recent  review of the basic economics  of capital  inflows in a IS-LM framework  see Frankel  (1993), for a recent
review  of Central  Bank intervention  see Eldison  (1993),  and for a recent  review  of the policy  issues  associated  to capital
inflows  see Calvo  et al (1993b).
7exchange  rate than otherwise,  as govermnent  consumption  is most likely more intensive  in non-tradable
goods than private expenditures.
*  Current  Account  Liberalization.  The liberalization  of the Current  Account  helps to ease  the pressure
on the domestic economy  by shifting aggregate  expenditures  towards tradable  goods. Like a restrictive
fiscal policy it has a composition  effect  that helps  to keep a higher real exchange  rate than otherwise.
*  Capital Outflow Liberalization. The liberalization of  capital  outflows may  induce domestic
investors, such as pension funds, to take their capital abroad. This may partially compensate  for the
effects  of capital inflows. 12
*  Move towards a floati  ange.  rate ssteym.  By moving  closer to a floating  exchange  rate regime,
such as widening  the band in a target zone exchange  rate system,  the exchange  rate risk ficed by market
participants increases. Therefore,  there will be less interest in bringing short-term  speculative capital
inflows.
4.3  Dealing with Volatility
The previous discussior.  refers to policies concerning mainly the real exchange rate and inflation
problems.  In what follows  we briefly discuss  some  potential  policy measures  to deal wih the volatility
associated  to portfolio  investment.
*  Restrictingz  oapal  outflows The purpose of this policy is to reduce the risk of a flow reversal by
limiting the amount of capital that foreign investors are allowed to take out of the country within a
certain period of time. Although  this policy can be quite effective  in reducing  the potential  damage  of a
sudden capital outflow, it is also very likely to reduce the amount of portfolio investment in the first
place, limiting  the economic  benefits of having  access  to foreign  financing. 13
v  Lifting all restrictions  on capital outflows. Given the previous result, one alternative  policy is to
allow domestic  residents  to invest in all kinds of foreign  assets with no restrictions.  This will have two
different effects: EM, as foreign investors will visualize the host country  as less risky (in tenns of a
lower probability of getting stuck in it) it may increase the amount of capital inflows; second, as
domestic assets will be better diversified intemationally,  the effects of a negative shock will be less
severe in the first place. Overall,  this policy may  reduce  the probability  of a flow reversal.
*  Opening  the current account.  A reasoning similar to the one in the previous  paragraph implies that
the opening of the current account may be useful in limiting the effects on the host country of a
negative  shock.  The opening  of the current account  will usually mean that the host country's  real assets
will be more diversified.  Therefore,  the economy  as a whole will be less affected  by a negative shock
affecting  an specific  productive  sector.
*  Maintaining  long-term fiscal and monetary targets. It should be clear at this point that the final
purpose of any potential policy measure should be to build an economy more resilient to  extemal
shocks, such that foreign investors do not want to leave  the country  when a negative shock occurs. In
this respect having some fiscal flexibility is a necessary  requirement in order to maintain a long- and
12  This is an ambiguious  result. In some models  a liberalization  of capital outflows cause a lirger capital inflow. See
Laban  and  Larrain  (1993).
13  Sea previous  footnote.:
8short-term  balanced budget.  The fiscal equilibrium  is necessary  to avoid an increase  in inflation  when a
negative  shock occurs. In the same  respect a long-term  monetary  target is almost  a must,  while building
a large stock of international  reserves may be very useful to face a shock. Finally, it is important  to
notice  that holding more  reserves  and maintaining  fiscal and monetary  discipline  helps  not only because
of the better shock absorber  capacity  of the economy,  but also because of the "signaling"  or "reputation
effect"  on foreign  investors.
*  Having grcater flexibility.  One useful policy tool which helps to build a stronger shock resistant
economy,  is to have a greater  discretion  in terms of forcing  the allocation  of resources  in some specific
uses. For example,  forcing  the investment  of private savings -such as pension funds- in Central Bank's
bonds (or in foreign  assets), may help to sterilize the expansion  in high powered money caused  by a
sudden capital inflow. Altematively, a sudden capital outflow that heavily reduces the amount of
(domestic)  money  may be compensated  by forcing  domestic  institutional  investors  to hold less Central
Bank's  bonds.
In sum, dealing with the risk of potential flow reversal of portfolio investnent is not a matter of
restricting  capital  outflows,  but building shock absorber  mechanisms  such that the effects  of a negative
shock to the economy  are minimized.
5.  Dealing with Capital Inflows: Some recent country experiences
As capital inflows towards some developing  countres resumed in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
countries  had to deal with some of the problems that we discussed  in the previous sections. In this
section we review some specific country experiences  in dealing with the macroeconomic  problems
created  by the capital  inflows.  Because  we are interested  in the way countries  responded  to the surge in
capital inflows, we will concentrate  our discussion in those policies that are most related to  this
phenomena.  Nevertheless,  in recent years several developing  countries  have also implemented  major
macro-stabilization  programs  and reforms,  aimed  to transform  their economies  and integrate  them more
with the world economy. 14 Thus, the policies  implemented  by some  of the countries  studied  below are
part of the undergoing  transformation  and stabilization  programs.
5.1  Argentina
Argentina,  as the other countries  analyzed in this paper, has Lreived  important  amounts  of capital
inflows for the past two years. In fact it appears  as the third largest recipient  of portfolio  investment
flows among  all Latin  American  countries  during 1989-June  1993,  after Mexico  and Brazil. 15
As opposed  to other  counties in our sample,  until very recently  and for more than a decade  inflation
in Argentina  has been persistently  high (hyperinflaton  in 1989-90;  see table 1). This was the result of a
high structural  public sector deficit (the deficit of the Central  Bank alone was almost 4.5% of GDP in
1989).16
*Beginning  in mid-1989,  the country  started a new period of economic  growth  and low inflation that
has been achieved through a profound transformation  of the economy. The latter comprises major
14 In particular,  Argentia, Mexico,  and  the  Philippines  in  recent  years  (late-1980s),  while  all  the other  countries  earlier  in
tfhe  decade  (mid1980s).
15  See  Gooptu  (1993).
16  The 1987-89  average  forthe Non-Financial  Public  Sector  balance  is -3.7/a of GDP.
9structural reforms to the Federal Government,  the Central Bank, public enterprises,  the tax system and
both the foreign exchange and foreign trade regimes. As part of this process, in June 1990 Argentina
resumed partial interest payments to  commercial banks.17 Later on, in  1992, Argentina reached a
Brady-type  agreement to restructu.-e  and reduce its public external debt with commercial  banks. In this
agreement  approximately  US$ 28 billion were restructured  (including  about US$ 20 billion of principal
debt outstanding  and US$ 8 billion of past due interest).
The economic reform implemented in Argentina has been extremely profound and has proceeded
very fast. Among the most significant  structural  reforms  are the following:
In January 1990,  the Central Bank forced the conversion  of its short term interest bearing obligations
with  the public, mostly seven days maturity bills, into long tenn  bonds with  ten years maturity
denominated  in dollars. This step alone reduced the quasi fiscal deficit of the Central Bank by about
4/5.
. A  major  restructuring of  the  tax  system, with  more  reliance on  the  VAT,  and  in  the  tax
administration system. This reform has enabled the federal government (including  the national social
security system) to increase  its tax revenues in almost 4 percentage  points of GDP, from 12.9%  of GDP
in 1989  to 16.7%  of GDP in 1992.
*  An administrative  reform to reduce the size and the scope of the federal  goverunent and to improve
the control mechanisms of public expenditures. As a result of this reform total employment in the
federal govermment  has fallen by more than 50% between 1990 and 1992, while the non-financial
public sector balance  became  positive for the first time in many years  in 1991 (0.2% of GDP).  18
A  Aajor  privatization  program started in 1990 with the sale of public assets and enterprises,  many of
them non-profitable.  Until end-1993  the privatization  program generated  almost nine (9) billion dollars
in cash revenues, while foreign debt was reduced by approximately  fourteen (14) billion dollars. Also,
it  is  estimated that  two  tbirds  of  all  foreign capital entering Argentina in  1992 was  due  to
privatizations. 19
*  In April 1991, the Govermnent enacted the Law of Convertibility as an attempt to accelerate the
stabilization  of domestic prices. Under this new exchange rate regime the nominal exchange rate is used
as an anchor  for the domestic  price level. The law fully guarantees  convertibility  of the local currency  at
a constant  nominal rate and proscribes  money creation except for the purchase of foreign  assets.20
*  In September 1992, a new Central Bank Law was enacted that made it independent of the non-
financial public sector deficit  The new Central Bank Charter prohibits lending to the non financial
public sector and proscribes  rediscounts (although  in the latter case some special exceptions  apply).
*  In 1991, the govenment  accelerated and completed a trade liberalization program that virtually
eliminated all export taxes and all quantitative constraints on trade, except for automobiles. Also the
17  The government  stopped  these payments  in March 1988.
18  Total employment  in the national adminishtaion  fell-from  671,479 in 1990  to'  284,215 in 1992.  However,  this includes
the twansfer  of teachers and health personnel to the provinces.  During 1989-93  the number of public employees  was
reduced  by more  than 300,000  through privatizations,  attrition,  and voluntary  reirement
19  Source: "Situacion  Latinoamiericana,  N° 13, February  1993.
20  These assets  may include  dollar-denominated  Argentina  Govemment  Bonds up to 30 percent
10-mvcimum  tariff on imports was reduced to 20% (after being 115% in mid-1988)  with some exceptions
at 35%. In October 1992, the  government (in an attempt to  compensate the export- and import-
competing sectors for the real exchange rate appreciation) increased in five percentage points the tax
rebate allowed to exporters  and from 3% to 10%  the flat tariff surcharge  applied to imports.
The policies implemented  in Argentina  have been aimed mainly at reducing the inflation rate and the
public sector deficit, rather than to deal with the problems created by capital inflows. In fact there has
been a shift away from inflation tax and inefficient taxes on trade and financial intermediation, and
towards other sources of government  revenue,  in particular  the VAT.
The policies have succeeded in reducing domestic inflation. The average monthly inflation rate has
been 5.2% in  1991 and 1.4% in  1992. while in 1989 it was 39% per month. In tenns of the real
exchange rate the result has been a real appreciation of, approximately, 21% and 27%, since the
convertibility  plan began in April 1991 and until the end of 1992 and the end of 1993 , respectively. 21
The real exchange rate has appreciated systematically  for the last three years as a result of using the
nominal exchange  rate as an anchor for domestic  prices in the current (and previous) stabilization  plans.
In spite of the favorable  results mentioned  above and although a major effort has been made in terms
of both, increasing  tax revenues and cutting expending at the federal govermnent  level, overall public
expenditures have not fallen mainly because of  an increase in transfers to  the  provinces and in
expenditures at  the  provLncial level. Also,  the  increase  in  foreign  savings  has  been  partially
compensated by a  fall in domestic private savings. Overall, a  significant effort in  cutting public
expenditure  remains to be done, particularly  at the provincial level.
Given the scope and the purpose of this paper, it is extremely difficult to evaluate the outcome
observed in Argentina, mainly because of the existing economic conditions prior to the stabilization
program (i.e., during 1988-89)  which were completely  different than those in Chile or Korea. In fact, it
can be argued that the appreciation  of the real exchange rate in Argentina is more related to inflation
inertia and to the use of the nominal exchange  rate as an anchor for domestic  prices, than to the increase
in aggregate  domestic expenditures  that is financed  with the increased capital inflows, which is the case
we are concerned with in this paper. Nevertheless it is still possible to argue that a more restrictive
fiscal policy, speciaUy  at the provincial level, is required in Argentina.
5.2  Chile
The Chilean economy is today the fastest growing economy in Latin America. A host of structural
reforms have been introduced in Chile during 1973-1992, aimed to achieve macroeconomic  stability
and to  increase the efficiency of the economy. The general direction of these reforms has been to
increase the  role of  markets, to  open the  economy to  foreign trade, and  to  give  an increasing
participation  to the private sector in the economy.  22
Since the mid-1980s,  the main instrument  of monetary policy used in Chile has been the 90-day real
interest rate on Central Bank liabilities 23. This rate is adjusted upwards  whenever  the level of aggregate
21  Using the Trade Weighted  REER (CPI) Index
22  For a review of the reforms introduced in Chile in the last twenty years see Corbo (1993) and Corbo and Fischer
(1993).
23  As most financial  contacts are indexed  to future inflation,  Chile can pursue a real interest rate policy  .
11demand is resulting in an acceleration  of inflation,  in an increase of the current account deficit, or in an
apnreciation  of the real exchange  rate.24
In early  1990, Chile experienced an investment boom. an export boom, a drop in international
interest rates, and an acceleration  of domestic inflation. As a response the Central Bank  increased the
90-day real interest rate on Central Bank's papers by 230 basis points (from 6.9 to 9.2 percent per year).
As a result  there was a large increase in capital inflows on top of the large increase in direct foreign
investment that was already taking place. To avoid the excessive monetization of these inflows, or a
sharp drop in the nominal exchange rate, the Central Bank practiced an aggressive  policy of sterilized
intervention. 25 As a net result, in  1990 alone the Central Bank ended up accumulating 2.4 billion
dollars in foreign reserves. Furthermore,  the issuing of Central Bank debt to carry out the sterilization
resulted in large losses for the Central Bank as it borrowed at high dotmestic  interest rates to invest
abroad  at lower rates adjusted  for exchange  rate changes. 26
As it became increasingly difficult and costly to pursue an independent  monetary policy, in June
1991 the Central Bank started to accommodate  a real appreciation  and to Itae a set of actions  to reduce
capital inflows. On that date, the central value of the exchange rate band was appreciated by 2%, a
stamp tax was imposed on capital inflows, and minimrum  reserve requirenents were imposed on short-
term (less than one year) foreign credits. At the same time a reduction from 15% to  11% in the
maximum import tariff was approved. Furthermore,  in January 1992, as it remained very difficult and
costly to affect the trajectory of the nominal and real exchange rate through sterilized intervention,  the
peso was revalued  5% and the width of the exchange  rate band was increased from ±5% to +10%. The
first part of the measure was meant to  "accept' a minor revaluation, and the second to increase the
exchange  rate risk and in this way to reduce the profitability  of domestic bonds for foreign  investors. At
the  same time the reserve requirement on foreign credits was extended to foreign currency bank
deposits.
As the central bank continued its policy of increasing  the domestic interest rate to control aggregate
demand and inflation, these measures  were not enough to discouge  capital inflows. Then, to increase
the exchange rate risk in March 1992 the Central Bank annourced that beginning that date it was going
to  intervene in the foreign exchange market even  if  the price of the dollar was well within the
exchange  rate band.
In May 1992 the reserve requirement on foreign credits was increased to 30%. The only exception
was made for capital inflow5  with a maturity  period longer than one year, that were registered with the
Central Bank under article 14 of the foreign exchange regulation. For the latter type of inflows the
reserve requirement was set at 20%. In July  1992 the  Central Bank modified the exchange rate
mechanism.  The peg was changed from the US dollar to a basket of currencies,  retaining the  size of the
band around the central rate. The purpose of this measure was, again, to increase the exchange rate risk
faced by foreign investors.  In August 1992  the reserve requirement  on capital inflows that entered  under
article 14 of the foreign  exchange law was also raised to 30%.
24  The Central Bank is implicitly  operating  with target ranges (or upper limits) for the inflation rate and  for the current
account deficit of the Balance of Payments  (as a share of GDP)  and with a lower limit  for the  real exchange  rate. For
details  see Corbo  and Fischer  (1993).
25  Implicit in this policy was the view that in a world of imperfect  asset substitution the Central  Bank, through sterilized
intervention, can effectively change the supplies of domestic and foreign assets, and in-this way it can affect the
evolution  of the nominal  and real exchange  rate.
26  For an evaluation  of macroeconomic  policies in recent years see Corbo  and Fischer  (1993).
12Finally, starting in 1992 a selective deregulation of capital outflows was introduced to give some
breathing  space to the expensive  policy of reserve accumulation.
This brief review of the policies that Chile has used to deal with some of the side effects of capital
inflows, mainly sterilized intervention, illustrates the difficulties that a country faces  in the global
capital markets of the 1990s when it wants to follow a restrictive monetary policy while pursuing also
an inflation and a real exchange rate target.
5.3  Colombia
As opposed to the other countries analyzed in this paper, Colombia has not received significant
capital inflows in recent years. Nevertheless, starting in  1986 Colombia has suffered the Japanese
problem, i.&,  a  very robust Current Account surplus that will become more robust with  the oil
discoveries  of Cusiana and Cupiagua. As the problems  created by a robust current account surplus are
the same as those created by a surge in capital inflows (i.e., a real exchange rate appreciation and an
acceleration  of domestic  inflation),  it is worth to analize  the policies  implemented  in Colombia in recent
years.
Beginning in  1986 and  partially because of  the  current account surplus, domestic inflation
accelerated in Colombia, increasing continuously from 18.9% in  1986 to 23.3% in  1987, 25.8% in
1989, and 29.1% in 1990. GDP growth reached  A.6%  for the period 1986-1990.
In  early  1990 the  government formulated a  medium-term strategy aimed  at  a  more  radical
tansformation of the Colombian economy. The major objective of this strategy was to open up the
economy  to external competition  to improve its efficiency, especially in the import-competing  sectors,
to promote the growth of non-traitional  exports, and utimately to achieve sustainable  growth. In the
new  strategy the continuous reduction of  inflation is a  key  intermediate objective to  provide an
environment  conducive  to growth. Reforms  were introduced  in trade, financial,  and labor policies, and
in public enterprise  management  and privatization.
Much has been already accomplished  in the reforms  of the trade regime. Most nontariff  barriers were
eliminated and the average import tariff was reduced from 43.7% in December 1989 to only 11.7%  in
Mirch  1992. By most standards this is a profound and rapid trade refonn.27 Initially the reform was
going to be gradual but its pace was accelerated  when the large surplus in the current account of the
balance of  payments was resulting in  a large accumulation of foreign reserves (Ocampo, 1992).
Restrictions on foreign exchange transactions were also liberalized in 1990, lifting the prohibition to
have foreign accounts and allowing  financial intermediaries  to trade in foreign exchange. Reforms also
included the liberazation  of direct foreign mvestment regulations and the liftng  of restrictions on
profit remittances.
The opening up of the Coiombian economy has been followed by a very robust current account
performance.  As shown in Table 3, the current account surplus reached 0.33% of GDIP  in  1990, and
3.12% in 1991.
As the Central Bank atempts  to reduce domestic  inflation and avoid a real appreciation  of the peso, it
has responded  by keeping an upper bound on the growth of aggregate  monetary indicators  and by using
a preannounced exchange  rate policy, where the value of the peso is depreciated on a continuous basis.
27  On  trade  reforms  in developing  countries  see Thomas  et at (1990).
13To achieve its monetary target in both 1990  and 1991,  the Central Bank intervened  using sterilization.
The mopping  up of liquidity resulted  in a sharp increase  in domestic  interest rates, with the deposit rate
increasing  from 29.2% in March 1991  to 38.5% in December  of the sanme  year. As a consequence  there
was a large build up of foreign  reserves  and an increase  in the quasi fiscal deficit of the Central Bank.
Sterilization  was also carried out by raising  the reserve  requirements  on bank denosits. Initially  the
average reserve requirement rate was raised in  1990 and then, as  foreign reserve accumulation
continued,  the marginal reserve requirement  rate was raised to  100% in January of 1991. As a result
there was a sharp increase  in  lending  rates resulting  from the increase  in  deposit rates and the increase
in reserve  requirements. As the increase  in interest rates  was slowing  down the economy,  in September
1991  the marginal  reserve  requirement  was eliminated  and the basic rate was raised 5 percentage  points.
These sterilization  measures  were accompanied  by measures  aimed at reducing  the amount of reserve
accumulation  in the central bank. Thus, in the second half of 1991 banks were required to hold a
minimum  of their net worth in foreign  exchange.  Also the minimum  period to pay for imports  bills was
reduced continuously  during the period.
As pressure continued to build up for a reduction  of interest rates, and as the quasi-fiscal  deficit of
the cental  bank was pressuring  the public finances,  later on the Central Bank changed its policy from
the control of monetary aggregates  to the control of the lending  rates of financial  intermediaries.  This
change in policy was followed by a drop in interest rates that contributed to an increase in domestic
expenditures  and a slow down of short term capital inflows. The resulting reduction in the current
account  surplus  and the decrease  in capital inflows resulted also in a slow down in the level of reserve
accumulation.  Therefore,  the need to carry out open market operations  with Central Bank certificates
has been reduced 28.
From this brief review of the recent experience  in Colombia,  like in the case of Chile, it is clear that
sterilized intervention  tends to exacerbate capital inflows rather than ameliorate them. This occurs
because it tends to increase  the differential  between domestic  and foreign interest rates. Furthermore,
sterilized  intervention  worsens  the quasi fiscal deficit of the Central  Bank
5.4  Indonesia
As an oil exporting  country,  during  the 1980s  Indonesia  suffered  a large adverse shock (a drop in its
terms of trade) beginning in 1982. As expenditures  were not reduced in pace with income, extemal
borrowing  increased. 29 In addition  to that, as Indonesia's  external  debt was mostly in the Yen area, the
depreciation  of the US dollar vis-i-vis other  currencies  during  tne second  half of the 1980s  accounts  for
a significant  increase  in Indonesia!s  total external  debt during 1985-87.  As a result of these two adverse
extemal shocks, Indonesia7s  total external debt increased tremendously  from 28% of GNP in 1980 to
69% of GNP  in 1991.
Mainly because of the  increasing indebteness of the  country, the  government began applying
restrictive  monetary  and fiscal policies  in 1986. Although  these policies  were quite effective  in reducing
the  debt burden, which dropped about 10 percentage points of (NP  from  1987 to  1989, total
28  Many  other minor actions were also used during  this period to deal with the excessive  foreign reserve  accumWulation.
For details  see Carasquilla (1993),  and Cirdenas  y Barren  (1993).
29  It  is important  to note  that the fiscal accounts  did not deteriorate  significantly  until  afer 1985.  Also,  while expenditures
did not adjust as fiast  as income,  it was still  the fastest  adjustment  of all oil-exporting  countries.
14indebtedness began increasing thereafter mainly because of private borrowing. 30 This pattern has
forced the government to keep applying restrictive policies in order to avoid major macroeconomic
imbalances.
Although tight monetary and fiscal policies had been applied since 1986, during the first half of
1990 an expansionary monetary policy was followed by Bank Indonesia (BI) in order to push down
domestic interest rates. Given the open capital account and the financial sector reforms of previous
years -that  led to a rapid growth of monetary aggregates during 1988-90--  the policy was not very
effective as  international reserves began to  fall and the current account balance deteriorated. This
outcome forced the goverrnment  to  reverse its policy as the economy was beginning to boom and
overheat (Inflation accelerated  and the current account  balance worsened  during 1990-9  1).
Notwithstanding,  during 1990191  and 1991/92  the government has made a concerted effort to curb
aggregate demand and  slow the  expansion in borrowing. This  has been done through improved
incentives  for non-oil exports, continued appropriate  and responsive exchange rate policy, responsible
monetary policy which reduced the growth in  domestic credit, restrained fiscal policy and cautious
public and semi-public  investment  programs. Several specific measures have been implemented  by the
Indonesian monetary authorities since mid  1990 to  limit monetary growth. Some of them are the
following:
- They forced a  large transfer (equivalent to  25%  of  base money) of public enterprise
deposits in the banking system  to papers issued  by BI.
- They imposed limits to the use of BI swap facilities  as a currency  hedge to avoid excessive
borrowing  from abroad.
- They  imUposed  limits on  commercial bank's external borrowing and  foreign currency
exposure.
- They imposed limits (in the form of annual ceilings) on the external borrowing of public
enterprises.
- They raised the interest rate on BI certificates  by 4%.
- Ihey raised banks' capital/asset  ratio, which was scheduled  to reach 8% by end 1993.
- They have also tried the sterilization  of capital inflows  through open market operations.
In addition to using monetary policy, some measures were taken to reduce aggregate demand by
restraining  public expenditure.  In late 1991, a ministerial level team was established  to supervise public
and quasi-public sector borrowing and investment This commission deferred the implementation  of
several large public and public related investment projects. Also, in early 1993 the subsidies to most
fuel products were eliminated.
The outcome of the reforms  and policies mentioned  above was an improved current account balance
and lower inflation in 1992. Also, the overall public sector balance shows an improving trend since
1988, while interest rates increased  in late 1990/early  1991 and began decreasing  thereafter. 3 1
30  The private  over total debtraio  has increased  from about 17%  in 1987  to about 34% in l991.
15In  sum, despite the  large extemrnal  debt and the constraints that it imposes on  the  Indonesian
economy,  the country has been able to keep growing while the annual inflation rate has remained  fairly
stable and at moderate levels during most part of  the last  decade. Overal, Indonesia's economic
authorities have been able to avoid major imbalances  despite the limited room they have to maneuver.
In part this has been the result of pursuing sound exchange rate, fiscal and monetary  policies. Also, they
have shown their willingness to implement  the required adjustrnent  policies whenever  necessary.
5.5  Korea
Although the capital account in Korea remains paitially closed, it has been progressively  liberalized
since 1984 when direct foreign investment  was freed. In 1984 direct portfolio investment by foreigners
was also partially liberalized. 32 In 1992 the direct purchase of Korean stocks by foreign investors was
further liberalized,  although some restrictions still apply. Following the 1984  and 1992  reforms, capital
flows into Korea have increased significantly, and particularly so in the last two years. The recent
flows have come mostly in the form of DPI33. However,  the potential problems  caused by these capital
inflows are not new to the Korean economy, since starting in 1986 and until 1988 and mainly due to the
economic  recovery of the industrialized  countries, Korea showed significant  current account surpluses
that created the same kind of problems  that an increase in capital inflows does, namely excess liquidity,
upsurge inflation, and an appreciation of the real exchange rate. During this period the  stock of
international  reserves  jumped from US$ 3.3 billion (in 1986) to US$ 16.6  billion (in 1992).
Since 1986, the government and the Bank of Korea have attempted to minimize the effects of the
increased liquidity in the economy by increasingly  implementing  sterilized intervention  and paying out
foreign debt. Thus, the stock of outstanding government securities increased almost 20 times in real
terms from end-1985 to end-1987, and almost doubled between end-1987 and end-1989 (also in real
terms). Since  then it has remained  stable.34
On the other hand, foreign debt (as a percentage of GNP) has fallen systematically  during the second
half of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's. This is particularly so for the case of long term
public (or publicly guaranteed) foreign debt Thus, as a percentage of GNP by end 1991 total foreign
debt had fallen to one third of its 1935 level, while long-term public and long term private foreign debt
had fallen to one fourth and one half of their 1985 levels,  respectively.
Nev  ertheless, in recent years inflation has increased -from less than 3%-on  an annual basis in 1985,
to almost 10% in  1991, and 6.2% in  1992-  while the real exchange rate has appreciated by 40%
(approximately)  during the same period.3 5 An explosion in nominal wares, following the transition to
democracy, has been one of the causes of the accelration  of inflation.-6 As a result the international
31  See Trends in Developng Economies Vol. 2, The World Bank (1993), and Indonesia Sustaining  Development The
World Bank (1994).
32  After 1984  foreigners  were allowed  to invest in Korean stocks  through investnent funds, and Korean companies were
allowed  to raise capital through equity-link  bonds.
33  The opening of the stock market  for foreign investors  in 1992 meant a capital inflow  of nearly US$800  millions during
the first quarter of the year alone.
34  The stock of govemment  securities  includes  T-bills,  Foreign Exchange Stabilization  Bonds,  and Monetary  Stabilization
Bonds. (Source: The World Bank).
35  The RER is measured  as the ratio between  the nominal exchange  rate and the CPI.
36  Nominal Wages  and the CPI increased  156%  and 43% between 1985  and 1991  respectively.
16competitiveness of the Korean manufacturing sector has fallen more than 50% in the same period,
mainly because of a significant  increase in wages.37
This outcome is also the result of two different elements. First, in spite of having a quite open
current account, the Korean authorities have failed to reduce the share of non-tradable goods in total
expenditure  as the investment in housing and other infrastructure projects has increased (construction
has grown very fast during 1989-92). Second, despite of increasingly  using open market operations to
reduce the  increase in  liquidity that results from the balance of  payments surpluses, the  Korean
authorities have  not been very  successful in  keeping monetary aggregates from growing, mainly
because of the lack of a large and deep market for govermnment  securities. Monetary aggregates keep
growing also because of the continued subsidized credit allocation policy applied by the government.
From 1986  to 1991, Ml, M2 and M3, all measured as a percentage of GNP, have increased from 10%,
37% and 79%, to 11%,  41% and 118%,  respectively.
5.6  Malaysia
Beginning in 1986, Malaysia received a large capital inflow -mainly  in the form of direct foreign
investment- and during 1991-92 the surplus in the capital account has been above 10% of GDP (see
table 11 below). This has occurred  despite the large stock of foreign debt which Malaysia  accumulated
during the early 1980s and which reached a peak in  19S6. Nevertheless, sound economic policies
introduced  since 1982  have been effective  in attracting foreign  investors to the country.
Also during this time period the country has maintained a managed float exchange rate system,
where the Central Bank intervenes  only to avoid excessive  variability  of the value of the Ringgit against
a  basket of  foreign currencies. The trade regime -as well as the  capital account are  quite open,
particularly so in the latter case. In fact domestic residents and foreign residents, in general, face only
minor restrictions  when undertaldng  international  transactions.3 8
Surprisingly, after 1985 and despite the capital inflows received from abroad, the authorities have
been able to keep inflation at a low level (compared to intemational standards), interest rates have
remained fairly stable, and the real effective exchange rate has been depreciating, increasing the
competitiveness  of the tradable sector. The real depreciation  of the Ringgit since 1985 reached a peak
of 34% in 1991 and began appreciating  thereafter.
The good performance  of the Malaysian economy since  the 1985-86  recession has been the result of
sound economic management Among the policies that have contributed to this outcome we can single
out the following:
First and most important,  a large fiscal adjustment.  In fact the Malaysian authorities  have been able
to reduce the overall public sector deficit from 5% of GDP in 1986, to a surplus of OA%  of GDP in
1992.39  Also, the increase  in public sector saving has allowed the country  to prepay its foreign debt at a
37  Measured as the ratio between the following: the multiplication of the nominal exchange rate and the Industrial
Production  Index, and the multiplication  of the Manufacturing  Employment  Index and the Wage Index. According to
an estimate  from the IMF the Manufacturing  Unit Labor Cost in Korea increased 46% between 1985  and 1989.
38  The only exceptions to this general rule are  ransactions  with Israel and South Africa. In these two cases and for
political  reasons both trade and financial  transactions  are heavily restricted.
39  The deficit-surplus  figures  account  for all expenditures,  including  gross capital formation and public  enterprises.
17rate of $ 1-2 billion a year during 1987-90,  and in this way it has been a major factor accounting  for the
successful  sterilization  of the monetary effects of the inflow of direct foreign investment. 40
Second, although direct foreign investment has contributed to a sharp increase in the investment
rate, absorbing the associated  capital inflow mostly into tradable goods, and therefore minimizing the
pressure for a real exchange rate appreciation, by  intervening in the foreign exchange market the
authorities have been able to achieve (until 1991) a  real depreciation. The Central Bank has been
steadily increasing its holdings of international reserves at an rate of 4.3 percent of GDP a year on
average  since 1986. By the end of 1992,  the stock of international  reserves held by the central bank was
larger that the country's total foreign  debt.
Third,  a tight monetary policy has contributed to the sterilization of the monetary effects of the
reserve accumulation.  This has been implemented  by imposing restrictions  on financial intermediaries,
such as a 1% increase (from 5.5% to 6.5%) in the required reserves ratio of banks and other financial
institutions in  1989, and the  imposition of  stricter conditions for the  granting of  certain type of
consumption credits (such as ciedit cards and motor vehicles purchase loans) in  1992. In addition to
this, the Central Bank has been increasingly  involved  in money market operations  to sterilize  the higher
liquidity caused  by the capital inflows.
Finally, a firther liberalization  of the economy in both, the current account and the capital account,
has been implemented.  In fact, during this time period the government  eased the guidelines for foreign
investment in the country (1986) and lifted some of the restrictions affecting domestic borrowing by
non-residents (1987 and 1989). They also implemented selective import tariff reductions in 1989-90
and a substantial import duties reduction package was announced for 1993. These policies served to
alleviate some of the pressure of the capital inflows in the domestic market by easing the increase in
imports.
In sum, like in the case of Indonesia,  a sound macroeconomic  management  with a low fiscal deficit
appears to be the most relevant aspect in the case of Malaysia During the private sector led recovery
after 1985 it has been important to restrain public sector expenditures  to attract foreign investment to
the country, as well as to make space in aggregate  expenditures for the increase in investment without
the need to squeeze exports.
5.7  Mexico
After the  debt crisis in  1982, Mexico spent the rest of the decade stabilizing its economy and
adjusting its policies and institutions to achieve sustainable growth. In this process a comprehensive
heterodox stabilization program was put in place in December i987. As part of this program, the
primary surplus increased by about 3 percentage points of GDP between 1987 and 1989, while the
economic balance of the fiscal sector (which includes interest payments) steadily improved from a
deficit of 14.4%  of GDP in 1987,  to a surplus of 1.6% in 1992. Initially, and for a short period of time,
the exchange rate was fixed. Later on, at the end of 1988, a rate of crawl at a decreasing nominal rate
was established. 41 In November 1991, an explicit exchange rate band system was announced, which
40  Total public sector long-term and medium-term  debt, as a percentage  of GDP, fell to half between 1987  and 1990.
41  This rate  has been adjusted  downwards  three times.  Initially it was one peso a day, then it was reduced to 0.80 of a peso
a day,  then 0.40 of a peso a day, and in November 1991  it was reduced  to 020 of a peso a day.
18meant a shift in the exchange rate policy away from the earlier goal of converging  to a fixed exchange
rate; the new goal is to have a band of reasonable  width.42
At the same time, a trade reform was implemented  which comprised the elimination of most non-
tariff impediments to trade and a significant drop in the average tariff rate -the  latter fell from 27
percent in 1982, to 22 percent in 1986, and further to 13 percent in 1992.  During the same time period
the tariff dispersion  fell from 24.8% in 1982,  to 14.1%  in 1986, and further to 4.5% in 1992. Also, the
percentage of imports (value) subject to import permits dropped from 100% in 1983 to only 13.7%  in
1990. There have also been major changes in domestic regulation and in  the transfonnation of the
public sector, including  the privatization  of a large number  of public enterprises.
The improvement in Mexico's economic prospects due to  the reforms, together with the drastic
reduction in US interest rates, have encouraged  a substantial increase in the level of capital inflows in
recent years. Portfolio investment increased from around 400 million dollars in  1989 to  14 billion
dollars in 1992. (See Table 7 below.)
To reduce the inflationary  pressure and the real exchange rate appreciation  of capital inflows, and
given the targets in terms of monetary expansion  set by the Mexican  authorities,  the latter decided early
on in  1990 to sterilize the monetary effects of capital inflows. Also, the increase in public savings
allowed the central bank to reduce the net domestic credit to the government  and helped to  create a
space in aggregate  expenditures  for the expansion  of the private sector expenditures  that was emerging
fiom the increased  capital inflows.
These policies were also supplemented  by  open market operations to reduce both the volatility and
the level of the expansion  in liquidity resulting from these inflows. For this purpose the govermment  has
created treasury bonds indexed to the exchange rate (tesobonos), and to  the consumer price index
(ajustabonos).  The sterilization  was also carried out through a contraction  in the net domestic credit of
the central  bank.
Furthermore, since October 1992 the exchange rate policy has been modified by widening  the band
between the official buying and selling points. 4 3, 44 By depreciating  on a daily basis the ceiling of the
exchange  rate band, that is the selling rate, while holding fixed the buying rate, the size of the band has
been increasing.  At the present time the ceiling of the band depreciates  at a rate of 04  of a peso a day.
With the current policy, by the end of 1993 the ceiling  rate was about 9% above the floor rate, and by
the end of 1994  it will be about 14% above  the floor rate.
Because capital inflows continued at a large pace, which implied a very large growth of monetary
aggregates,  the authorities decided  to take some additional measures.  In an attempt to limit the foreign
exchange exposure of domestic banks, indirect restrictions to capital inflows were introduced in early
1992. In April 1992 the Banco de Mexico restricted  the foreign  cunrency  liabilities  of commercial  banks
42  Starting  in October  1992,  the ceiling  of the exchange  mte band  began  to be depreciated  by 0.40 pesos  per day,  while
the floor  of  the-band  was  kept  fixed.
43  By widening  the band,  the exchange  rate risk faced  by foreign  investors  seeking  short-term  gains  will increase.  See
previous  footnote.
44  Although  the official  buying  and selling  rates  may  be the floor  and ceiling  of the band,  no transaction  takes  place at.
these  rates in reality.  Instead,  there is an inter-bank  market  which operates  -within  the band,  with actual  buying  and
selling  taking  place  at this rate  (with  just a very  narrow  market-determined  spread  to cover  transaction  costs).
19to 10%  of their total liabilities. 45 The authorities  also introduced  a 15  percent  reserve  requirement  on
all the borrowing  from abroad  denominated-in  foreign  currency.  Then,  in November  of the same  year,
the former  restriction  was changed  by allowing  commercial  banks  to raise  foreign  currency  deposits  for
specific  uses  for up to 20%  of their  total liabilities.  This  change  was  designed  not to increase  the foreign
exchange  exposure of commercial  banks,  although  it indirectly  allowed  for a less restrictive  monetary
policy.4 6 Yet,  during  the whole  period  the authorities  remained  using  sterilization  as a measure  to limit
the expansion  of monetary  aggregates.
5.8  The Philippines
Durir&g  the 1980s,  a series  of structural  reforms  were undertaken  in the Philippines.  These  reforms
were both at the macro and micro level and included  the following:  (1) a restructuring  and partial
privatization  of government  owned  banks;  (2) a push  forward  of the trade  liberlization by eliminating
most quantitative  restrictions;  (3) the privatization  of public corporations;  (4) the liberalization  of
interest  rates  and deregulation  of financial  markets;  (5)  the disbandment  of domestic  monopolies;  (6) a
tax reform;  and (7) the deregulation  of previously  controlled  domestic  prices. Taken  together  these
policies  have opened  the economy  to competition  and have corrected  many policy-induced  internal
distortions.
As a result economic  growth  resumed  during  1987-89  while  inflation  was brought  under  control  to
about 10%  per year.  The consolidated  public  sector  deficit  was also reduced  from 9% of GDP  in 1983
to 5.5%  of GDP  in 1990,  and further  to 2.4%  of GDP  in 1991  and 1.7%  in 1992.  However,  until  recent
years  the sizable  deficit  of the public  sector  kept domestic  interest  rates at a high level.  Also,  given  the
high level of indebtedness  of the Central  Bank  of Philippines  (CBP) and the high level of domestic
interest  rates  --the CBP  accounted  for about  55%  of the consolidated  putolic  sector  deficit  during  1986-
90 47--  it has become  increasingly  difficult  for  the CBP  to implement  monetary  policy.
Nevertheless,  since 1990 the CBP has been issuing substantial  amounts  of its own domestic
securities  to counteract  the increase  in liquidity  that is caused  by the surge  in capital  inflows  of recent
years. Consequently,  the CBP has been able to purchase  a net amount.  of over US$ 3 billion since
January  1991.  Also  the government  has helped  to sterilize  some  of the increase  in liquidity  by issuing
T-bills and using the proceeds  to make a deposit  with the CBP. Thus, given the limited room of
mnaneuver  for the CBP,  since  1989  monetary  policy  has  also  been  managed  by the National  Govemment
by means of transfers  to the CBP in the form of deposits,  although  at a cost of increasing  domestic
interest  rates and worsening  the CBP balance. 48 In addition,  the CBP has also increased  the reserve
requirements  (RRs)  of banks.  In 1990,  RRs  were inreased by 4 percentage  points  to 25%.
Other  policies  implemented  in the Philippines  are the following:
45  Interpreted  as an attempt  to reduce  the exchange  risk exposure  of domestic  baunks,  this policy  would  have only an
indirect  (negative)  effect  on capital  inflows.
46  It is important  to note  that  those  banks  with existing  dollar  exposures  above  the limits  (10%  initially,  thcn  up to 20%)
did not have  to reduce  the nominal  dollar  amount  of their  liabilities.  Rather,  they-were  allowed  to hold them steady
until  their  total portfolio  grew  sufficiently  that they  would  meet  these  limits.  This is inportant as most  of the largest
banks  were  above  the limits  to begin  with,  so it in effect  amounted  to a freeze  on further  liabilities.
47  Since  1986  the losses  of  the CBP  have  been  about  2%  of GDP.
48  This CBP  financial  problem  has recently  been  addressed  by the authorities  through  rstructuring'  of the CBP.  Non-
viable  assets  were carved  out for eventual  liquidition  and the CBP  itself  received  resources  in  'the on  of T-Bills  so
that  it can  maintain  positive  net  income  and carry  out monetary  policy  independent  of the  National  Government
20"(1)  In  1988, the  government completed a  previous program  requiring the  elimination of  all
quantitative restrictions on  imports of capital and internediate! goods.-  In July- 1991, another
program was  issued  establishing the  gradual  reduction of  tariffs  through  June  1995 and
simplifying  and rationalizing  the tariff code.49
(2)  In 1991, the Foreign Investment Act liberalized the environment for foreign investment in the
Philippines.
(3)  In September 1992, the govenmment  also took several extraordinary  steps to deregulate  the foreign
exchange  market by allowing exporters  to retain up to 100% of their revenues and eliminating  all
the restrictions  on the use of foreign  currency  for both current and capital  account transactions.
The case of the Philippines,  like the case of Argentna, is a difficult one to evaluate, mainly because
the policies being applied are very recent. However, the inflation rate increased slightly during 1988-
1992, while the real exchange rate appreciated  by 14%.50 Overall, in spite of the very little room for
both monetary and fiscal policy (specially the former), the ongoing stabilization  -program reduced
inflation in 1992-  and built up international  reserves. The current account deficit clearly shows that the
extemal trade balance has been the most affected  by the surge of capital inflows in the Philippines,  with
a worsening of the deficit of eight percentage points of GDP during 1988-1992.  This also shows the
effectiveness  of the liberalization  of the foreign  trade regime in recent years.
5.9  Thailand
Begiing  in 1986,  Thailand's economic  growth has been very impressive  compared with almost  any
country worldwide, averging  11%  on an annual basis during 1986-90.  The growth in 1991 and 1992
has been slightly lower than in the previous years, reaching 8% and 7.5% respectively, which in part
can be explained because of the tight fiscal and monetary policies being pursued in Thailand durng
1988-91  and their effects on private domestic  demand. 51
The main reasons explaining Thailand's  econonic growth are the increase in private investment  and
the increase in manufacturing  exports.  -Gross  investment as a percentage of GDP rose 17 percentage
points between 1986 and 1991. In particular, Thailand has benefited from a surge in foreign direct
investment from Japan and other Asian NIEs and from an increase in foreign trade in the region. The
flow of foreign capital to Thiand  fcr the last five years has been on average  higher than 10% of GDP
and has been originated  by private demanLd.  The surge in exports is explained  by both, the abolition of
export taxes in 1985 and the depreciation fthe Baht in 1984.
In recent years, the fiscal balance  has movedfrom a deficit of 5% of GDP in 1984-85 to a surplus of
5% of GDP in 1989-90. The turnaround inm  the fiscal accouints  resulted from both, an increase in tax
revenues and a reduction in expenditures,  although  the latter has been more important than the former.
49  However,  a temporary  import  surcharge  of 90%D  was  introduced  in 1991  as away to balance  the fiscal  deficit  due to-the
poor  response  of tax revenues  to the  tax reform.  'iis  surcharged  was  discontinued  after  one  year.:  -
50  Notice  that because  of the cyclical  behavior  of both indicators,  the results  are  yey  different  if we  :consider  the period
starting  in 1986  instead.  However,  given  the size.  of the capital  flows  to Philippines,  the 19S892 period  seems  more
relevant  to evaluate.
5I  The  overall  public  sector  balance,  measured  in  percentage  points  of CGD.  increased  from  a-surplus  of 1.3%  in 1988,  to
4.1% in 1989,  4.7%/o  in 1990,  and 3.0%  in 1991  (fiscal  year  ending  September  30). Source;  IMF. Other  reasons.  also
help  to explain  the slowdown  .in economic  growth  duing. 1991  and -1992  in.Thailand  (see  the.  latest  paragraph  in this
section).  - . ....  ..
215.From the beginning  of the 1980s  to the end of the decade total revenue increased by about 4% of GDP
and total expenditures  fell by about 5% of GDP. 52
In  addition  to  the  substantial tightening  of  fiscal policy,  Thailand's economic authorities
implemented  a series of other measures to reduce domestic aggregate demand and to counteract the
increase in money growth and the excess liquidity that was being caused by the capital inflows. The
policies  implemented  comprise  the following:
*  Further liberalization  of capital outflows. In April 1991, the capital account  was further liberalized
by allowing domestic residents to take abroad up to US$ 5 millions for investment  purposes and to
open foreign  currency  accounts  with commercial  banks in Thailand.
*  Sterlization of mone  impulse. Because  of the large capital inflows  to Thailand  -which  in 1989
exceeded in  value the stock of  reserve money at the  start of the  year-  the  Central Bank has
implemented  open market operations  to absorb liquidity. This has been implemented  by the Bank of
T-hailand  issuing its own bonds, in addition to the deposits by the Treasuxy  with the Cental  Bank
implied  by the fiscal stupluses  of recent years.
Reduction  of trade bares.  A significant  progress  in furthering  import tariff reiorm has been made
for the past years. In October 1990, tariffs on capital goods used in manufacturing  were reduced from
20% to 5% and all existing exemptions  or reductions  of tariffi were abolished.  As a result the average
import  duty rate has fallen from 14%  in 1986  to 90/%  in 1991.
*  Imposition of taxes in foreign borrowing.  In March 1990, a 10 percent withholding  tax on interest
paid on foreign  loans  was restored  after two years of being suspended.
*  Tightening of monetary policy. The authorities imposed "voluntary"  limits on commercial  bank's
lending to  "non-productive"  activities such as  consumer loans, mortgages and the construction of
luxury condominiums,  etc. Also, in 1989 the Central  Bank's refinancing facility,  that promotes  priority
sectors development by lending at preferential interest rates, began to reduce the total amount of
refinancing  and to increase  its rediscount  interest  rate.
The outcome that resulted from all the policy measures  mentioned above is impressive,  not only in
terms of the high rate of economic  growth observed  in Thailand  in the past six years, but also in terms
of the low inflation rate and the fairly stable real exchange mtefi3  I  fact the inflation rate, although
increasing  between 1986 and 1991, still remains at a low level by any interational standard  and seems
to have stabilized  after falling  more than one-and-a-half  percentage  point from its 1991 level.
The most outstanding  result in the case of Thailand concerns  its international  competitiveness,  as
measured by the real exchange rate, which has remained fairly stable. In fict  it remained almost
constant from  1986  to  1990 and  began  appreciating thereafter. Nonetheless the  accumulated
appreciation  during 1990-92  has been less than 9%.
52  It should be pointed  out that the consolidated  public  sector balance  deteriorated  in recent  years, going from a surplus  of
about  4% of GDP in 1991,  to a surplus  of only 1% of GDP in 1992,  and further to a deficit of about 1% of GDP in
1993 (fiscal  year ending September  30). Source:  IMF.  This was due to both, a decrease  in total revenues  and grants and
an increase  in public  sector expenditures.  (See  the latest  paragraph  in this section).
53  1't  RER appreciated  less  than 5% during 1986-1990.  See the discussion  in section 6 below.
22It is worth noticing that the results observed in Thailand could have been different had not the
economic  authorities  decided  to ease monetary policy and to expand  public expenditures  beginning  in
late 1991.  In fact, as a response  to the slowdown  in external  demand  that resulted  from the slowdown  in
economic  activity in the developed  countries in recent years, and to counteract for the lower capital
inflows that resulted from the Middle East crisis in 1990-91 and the political problems in Thailand
during 1991-92  --that affected  negatively  private investment  and consumption-, public  expenditures  in
Thailand increased by more than 2 percentage  points of GDP between 1990 and 1992.54  This recent
increase  in public  expendiures also resulted  from the need to solve  the bottlenecks  in infrastructure  that
developed  during the fast growing period (1987-90).  Also monetary  policy was eased in September
1991  when the Bank of Thailand  lowered  its discount  rate by 1  percentage  point.
6.  Economic Policy: Some  Lessons
The countries analyzed in this paper have implemented  different policies to compensate  for the
monetary  and real effects  of the surge in capital  inflows  of recent  years.  The outcome  has been  different
for each country  and the degree  of success vanes among  them. In this section  we attempt  to summarize
the most important findings  by comparng the nine country experiences.  Table 10 below shows the
different policy-mix used by each of the countries included in the sample, while tables 11 and 12
summarize  the outcome  in some  key macroeconomic  variables  for all the countries  in the sample.
Concerning  the outcome in each of the countries  there are some important general facts fhat are
worth noticing.
First, it can be argued that all the countries have been successful  in avoiding a permanent and
significant  increase in inflation.  In fact, in Argentina  and Mexico  inflation has been decreasing  for the
past three to four  years, while in the other seven  countries  inflation  has remained  fairly stable.  Although
in the case of Malaysia inflation seems to be increasing  during the last two years, it is also true that
Malaysia  shows the lowest  inflation  rate among  all of the countries  in the sample.
*  Second,  in terms of the pattem shown by the real exchange  rate, we can spl;t our sample  into two
different  groups. In the first group we include Chile, Indonesia,  and Malaysia, which have avoided a
significant  real exchange  rate  appreciation  (Malaysia  shows  a real depreciation).  In the second  group we
include Argentina,  Korea,  Mexco, ana the Philippines  which have  had a strong appreciation  of the real
exchange  rate. Thailand  lies in between  these two groups.
*  Third,  the countries  that have received  the largest  capital  inflows  (as a percentage  of GDP, see Table
12) on average during 1989-92,  arm  not those that have experienced  the largest real exchange rate
appreciation.  In fact the largest recipients of capital inflows (Thailand, Maaysia  and Chile), have
experienced  either a depreciation  or a low appreciation  of their currencies.  It is important  to note that
Thailand has experienced  a lower appreciation  thafi Korea in spite of receiving a much larger capital
inflow. Also, during 1986-90  the RER in Thailand appreciated  only 4.8%Mo,  aid  it began appreciating
faster in 1991-92 after the government  decided  to easy monetary  and fiscal policy as a response  to the
slowdown  in aggregate  demand.
*  Fourth, those countries  that show a decreasing  pattem of government  consumption  -as a percentage
of GDP- are also those that show a lower real exchinge rate appreciation (Malaysia, Chile and
54  Ovrall public  seor  expendures  and net lnding inmeased  fm  19.7%  of GDP  in i990, to20.6%  ofrGDP  in1991,
and  fiher  to 22%  of GDP  in 1992  (fiscal year  ending  September  30).  Source:  IMF.
23Indonesia). It is again important to notice that during 1986-90,  the period when Thailand reduced its
government consumption  by 3;4% of GDP, the RER appreciated only 4.8% ifn  spite bf receiving (oh
average)  capital inflows for about 7 percentage  points of GDP.
Those countries that show an increasing share of government consumption in GDP (Argentina,
Mexico, Korea  and The Philippines)  are the same that show the highest real exchange  rate appreciation,
in spite of not being the largest recipients of capital inflows.
Overall, the sample studied in this paper does not provide strong evidence to suggest that there is a
clear regional difference in the way countries have responded to the surge of capital inflows in recent
years. However it could be argued that, with the exception of Chile in Latin America, and Korea and
the Philippines  in East Asia, countries in the latter region have tended to rely more on a restrictive  fiscal
policy than countries  in Latin America.
In addition, some less general (i.e., more country specific) conclusions  in terms of economic policy
can be drawn from the cases studied in this paper.
First, the experiences  of Chile and Colombia clearly illustrate  the difficulties that a country faces in
the more integrated and  -global capital mnarkets  of the  1990s, when it wants to follow a restrictive
monetary policy while at the same time pursuing an inflation and a real exchange rate target. What
these two experiences  show is that sterilized intervention  tends to exacerbate  capital inflows rather than
to ameliorate them. This occurs because it tends to increase the differential between domestic and
foreign interest rates.  Furthermore, as  the  experience in  The Philippines also  shows, sterilized
intervention  worsens  the quasi fiscal deficit of the Centmal  Bank.
Second, by contasting  the experiences of  Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand against those of
Colombia, Korea, Mexico and the  Philippines, one  can argue that sterilized intervention is  most
effective when it is accompanied  by fiscal restraint The main policy responses in the former countries
were a substantial  tightening of fiscal policy and sterilized intervention, while in the latter group of
countries  the fiscal adjustment-was  less severe.
Third,  by comparing  the experiences  o. Thailand and Malarsia in the mid-1980s against those of
Argentina and The Philippines more recently, it seems possible to argue that in spite of the favorable
evolution of both tax collection (increasing) and public spending (decreasing) in the latter group of
countries, a significant effort in cutting public expending remains to be done. The persistence of the
overall public sector deficit seems to be an obstacle to achieve a higher RER and higher economic
growth.
7.  Summary and Final Remarks-
During the last five years there has been an increasing  interest in investors from industial countries
in investing in developing countries,  particularly  in those that have stabilized their economies  and that
have carried out  major reforms-  of their policies and institutions; opening up  their  economies to
interational  competition,  increasing  the reliance on market signals, and deag  the role of the state
in the production of private goods. The better prospects of the recipient countnes and the lower level of
interest rates in the interational markets have contnrbuted  to this change.-
The increase in  capital inflows to  developing countries has ;relieved the  balance of  payments
constraint of the recipient counies,  but at the same time has created some new problems. These new
24problems are  mainly two:  an  increase in  monetization and  inflation, and a  real exchange rate
appreciation.  Conceming  the nine country  experiences  analyzed  in this paper, some  general remarks  are
in order.
First, there is a role for the Central Bank to play in order  to avoid some of the side effects  of capital
inflows.
Second, to get the benefits of capital inflows  while at the same time ameliorating  some of their side
effects, a tight fiscal policy seems to be the most effective  policy to!  avoid a large appreciation  of the
real exchange  rate. Those  countries  that increased  their public  savings  were able to leave  more space for
the increase  in private  sector investment  that was being financed  by the capital inflow.
Third, the increase in public sector savings seems to be the only sustainable  policy to protect the
real exchange rate in  the  lng  run and seems to be perceived more favorably by the international
investors  community.
Fourth,  a mixed fiscal/monetary  policy seems to be more appropriate in the short run than pure
fiscal policy.  This occurs  because fiscal  policy usually  lacks  the required  flexibility  to deal with volatile
capital flows in the short run. However, the high volatility of portfolio investment flows imposes a
medium-  and long-term  constraint  in terms of keeping  fiscal  policy aligned  with fundamentals.
Fiffth,  the use of sterilized  intervention  has shown  not to be very effective  as a mechanism  to protect -
the real exchange  rate from appreciating,  especially  in the long-run.  Although  this policy may work in-
the short-run, the  increase in domestic interest rates that goes along with it provides additional
incentives  for capital  inflows.  Finally,  this policy  is not sustainable  in the long run because  it has shown
to worsen the quasi-public deficit of the Central Bank. The latter may be the source of speculative
attacks  on the exchange  rate.
Sixth, letting domestic interest rates fall to  levels consistent with the expected depreciation-
augmented  international  interest rates, seems to be necessary  to reduce the inflows of capital. As the
experiences  of Colombia and Indonesia show, letting the domestic interest rate adjust reduces the
incentives  for capital inflows  and eliminates  the-quasi-fiscal  losses of the Central  Bank. The aggregate
demand  effects  of the lower  interest  rate needs to be dealt with through  a fiscal adjustment.
Seventh, the impediments to capital iMflows  by imnposing  quantitative  constraints or ceilings on
foreign  boirrowing  by banks or other lirge borrowers  (large enterprises),  or the sterilization  through  the
purchase  of Cental Banik's  liabilities  by large investors  (pension  func'.or public enterprises),  proves to
be effective  in  - -hor  nun as long as it does not cause an increase in domestic interest rates and
additional capital inflows. However, given the worldwide integration and globalization of financial
markets and the sophistication of financial intermdiaries, this sort of policy does not seem to be
effective  in the long run. Also, this type of constraints may be very damaging to the economy  as a
whole,  because of its related  -pervasive  effects on resource allocation  and efficiency,  and most probably
it will have  negative effects  on the total amount of capital inflows  to the country  as it may be perceived
negatively  by international  investors.....,
In sum, capital inflows  not only allow  the benefit  of a-relaxation  of a balance  of payments  constraint,
but also could create some macroeconomic  adjustment problems. In this  sense capital flows to
developing countries,,  if properly,  handled, can be both the result and the cause of high economic
--  ...  *  ,  ¶;
25.growth.  However,  a poor  economic  policy  management  in the recipient  country  may  cause  a reversal  of
flows  rather  than enhancing  their continuance.  The use of the appropriate  policy  tool  may be crucial  to
attain  a sustainable  and higher  rate  of growth  and investment.  The only  sustainable  policy  to use seems
to be fiscal  policy,  not only because  of the highly  integrated  financial  markets  around  the world,  but
also  because  monetary  policy  becomes  less effective  whenever  there  is a nominal  exchange  rate  target.
This  is particularly  true  for  those  flows  that are highly  volatile  such  as private  portfolio  investment.  For
capital inflows of a more long-term  characterstic, the authorities  should be ready to allow the
adjustment  mechanism  to work through  a real appreciation.  In this case a fiscal adjustnent could
accompany  the  capital  inflow  to reduce  the size  of the required  appreciation  and  or to distribute  the real
appreciation  through  time.
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INDONESIA  19117  15S  1939  199  1991  1992
RESERVES:  NET  CING IN HlDGS (3)  92S  -S76  451  .466  -2100  -2060  -:340
SHORTTERM  CAPITAL  1300  970  403  -9t  -229  214  127
LONGTERMCAPrrAL  2353  2213  1333  2510  3724  4440  4044
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  263  -a  -93  -173  -93  -12  .3
NET  DIRECT  INVESTMENT  253  335  576  612  3090  1480  1770
CAPITAL  ACCOUNT BALANCE  4130  3410  2220  292D  4500  6130  5260
NErERRORSANDOMIS9ONS  -1270  -753  -933  -i320  744  -517  -115
W.F  HBl  erPayn  Simi
fie  Woddflak
Name  (I)Aa  inasirim  tje  Andn  irn - ea  x  ius  m oihe  o  RER
(21  Caqipda.  Wtwica.
(3) AcI  n_  b  ino  - irniser  ree  sTABLES
A  : MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS
KOREA  It"  19117  ISM  1989  199  l99l  1992
AVERAGE  INFLATION  (%)  2.75  305  7.1s  570  3.51  '165  6.24
REALEFFECTIVEIEXCH  RATE15s-IaoIhI  104.45  112J33  130.12  142.81  14202  15003  143.l3
RESERVEMONEY(L.c.SMILLIONS)  5017000  7469000  972,  1211900  llFIIOCO  10322000  15107101
NET  DOMESTIC  CREDIT  3540010  50591120  1295590  2493510  3053200  5654600  4496400
NET  FOREIGN  ASSm  1476W0  2379150  5429410  10325420  10757NW  1h37400  13610600
INVESTMENT(%GDP)(2)  2L.13%  29.46%  3064%  33.35%  3695%  3903%  15.17%
NATIONAL  SAVINGS  1%  GOP)1(2)  3095%  34.42%  36.95%  34.76%  35.45%  35.93%  3445%
-PRIVATE  CONSUMMON (% ODP)  (2)  5.9W.  53  43%  51.94%  53.56%  5320%  52.67%  5$tO%
- OVERWrCONSUMPTON{%GDPI(2I  10.06%  913%  9.76%  10.53T  10.l%  10.67%  1135%
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  DEFICIT  I¶  GDP)  (2)  .2.60%  4.9%  -. 30%  *1  4 1%  1 47%  309%  1140%
B: BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS  SELECTED  DATA
KOREA  1916  1957  191  I m  1990  1991  1992
RESERVES:NeTCHNGINHILDGS  (3)  -165  -2260  -36m0  -25.70  421  1090  -3420
SHORTTERMCAPrTAL  -1419  -462  .S4  1230  3625  756  -371
LONGTERM  CAPITAL  .3202  4735  -3642  *4332  -1370  3156  227
PORTFOLIO  INVESTMENT  301  -113  -432  -29  all  3120  5740
NNETrDIRECT  INVESTMENT  325  418  720  453  .105  -240  -500
CAPITALACCOLNTRBALANCE  -3n0  .-930  -4250  -2630  2970  6830  7150
NET  ERRORS  AND OMISSIONS  -547  1130  -591  690  -2010  753  1IW0
Snrc  IMF,  Intenudaa  rIm.d  Seaside,
IMF.  BfmaIoeeorPayrl StESma
Na  (I  I  Anlmtm  Ini  teimdm  Biaprelam  rf dw  REL
(2)  CDanpuad  at  amau pree
(3)  A regstivwmbaeuas  - ineece  'a renews
TABLE6
A: MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS
R5U  WTSIA  1936  1987  195  19"  190  1991  . 992
AVERAGEINFLATIONCA)  0.74  029  2.56  2.S1  162  4.36  4.77
REALEFFECrIVEEXCC4RATECB-IC)(I)  t3.94  79.53  72.16  70.17  61.01  66.09  70.26
RESERVEMONEY(L.e.SMILLIONS)  10134  10664  1IB94  14713  18145  20771  22150
-NET DOMESTIC  CREDIT  4191  -S769  -6435  4-666  4375  -9677  432593
-NET FOREIGN  ASSETS  16325  19433  13330  21650  27020  30447  54743
INVESTMENTr  %ODP)  (2)  25.99%  23.1S%  25.96%  29.09%  32.0S%  3633%  33.33%
NATIONALSAVINGS(%  GDP) (2)  25.40%  31.09%/  30.73%  28.74%  28.19%X  2E.01%  30.90%
-MPVATECONSUMPTION  (  GDP)  (2)  50.9S%  4733%  49,37%  51.09%  53A.2%  54.69%  51.57%
-GOVERNr CONSUMInON (6 GDP)  (2)  16.94%  15.37%  14.30%  14.40%  14.01%  14.20%  13.51%
CURRENTACCOUNTDEFICIT(%GDP)Q()  0.5%  X  7.91%  -4.73%  0.354  3.59K  331%  2.93%
B: BALANCE  OF PAYMENTS  SELECTED DATA
(h1  .UkIIsuordIaru)
MALAYSIA  19U16  19J7  2932  199-  190  1991  992
RESERVES:  NET CING IN HLDGS  (3)  -1140  -1470  1070  -126D  -1990  -1170  -6590
SHOEI'TERMC4PITAL  -IQ0S  -969.1  -1140.9  - 563  230.52  610.55  3078.75
LONG TERM  CAFITAL  600.75  -1107.22  -1496  -569.5  -5S  642  243
PORT0FLIOINVESINENT  29.3  140  -443  -107  -255  170  -1110
NET DIRECT  INVESTMENT  439  423  719  o670  2330  4070  4120
CAPIrALACCOUNTBALA4CE  1110  -1520  -2360  155D  2250  SSW0  6330
NET ERRORS  AND  OMISSIONS  476  20  9&7  -101  1330  270  2010
S5Ne  IM.  IMCDSAuhFrmrd EI
IMJ.  B3aamo  Farsms  Sisisics
lhe Wod dBank
Naea  (I) An  inae  shine  e  lde  n  ian  sprseeion aribe  RER
(2)Cmpadatcuumtpuiee
WA)Anepve.anneer sn  an  inaem in  veLTABLE 7
A iMACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
MEKXlfO  h196  19W7  1913  139394)  1991  1993  1992
AVERAOEINFLATION(%)  3623  131.13  11416  2001  26.6b  2266  15.51
REALIPIFECTIVEEXCII.  RATE (35-I00)I1)  30.53  30.71  100.76  1D6.43  113.89  1329.4  145.43
RESERVEMONEY(Lc.SMlLLIONS1  1444  1440_  10374  23012  31135  39797  45536
-NET DOMSTICCKEDIT  5946  -493  16013  19011  20112  5246  4370
-NPTFOREI1NASSPTS  2493  1U95  4051  4001  10953  34551  41166
INVESTMENT(0%GDP)(2)  18.54%  19.26%  2041%  21.41%  21.119%  22.36%  23.30%
NAIIONALSAVINGSI%GODP)(I)  11.00%  21.60%  1,110%  1830%  19.00%  17.60%  16.301
. PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  (%  Qop) (2)  6b.45%  65.M4%  6941%  70.33%  70.16%  71  69%  72.20%
*GOV  ERNTCONSUMPTION(%  GDP) (23  9.10%  3,79%  3.U4%  3.45%  3.42%  9.01%  10.10%
CURRENTACCOUNTDEFICIT(%GDP)(2)  0.54%  .2.34%  1.61%.  3.11%  2.39%  476%  7.00%
l:  BALANCE  OF PAYMENTS  SELECTED  DATA
Jim  millions  ofiudil)
Mla;ICO  39Y6  1927  193  1939  199  3993  312
RESERVES  NET  CHNG  IN HLDS  (3)  232  -56H0  6790  121  -2020  -7620  .1930
SHORT  TERM  CAPITAL  694  -5049  -678  -936  2U45  3413  6235
LONGTERMCAPITAL  -272  1193  -4950  -1194  E410  6917  730
PORTFOLIOINVESTMENT  -E16  -397  1680  433  -5360  9270  14100
NET  DIRECT  INVESThIIENT  1520  3250  2590  3040  2630  4760  5370
CAPITALACCOUNT  BALANCE  1130  -1000  -1360  1350  8530  24400  26400
NETERRORSANDOMISSIONS  453  2610  -2540  2790  390  -25W0  -1360
Scm  3M  IN nuilmulm Pimanda  Suadiksfc
IW,  RdniceaPziuesSinstka
lia Anmcn C  _nmns  FoPec
hue  walde  B  k
Notes  (I)Anincmlnihebuh  nlaaum  sprwland oftheRE
j  Computead  s  c  iyc
(3)  A nqstve  number  mussm  inhcuvc  in mum.
TABLE 3
A:  MACROELONOMIC  INDICATOIRS
PHILIPPINES  1936  1937  19  1959  1990  1991  1992
AVERAGE  INFLATION  (A3  0.75  3.79  3.76  12.21  14.14  IE71  8.92
REAL EFFECTIVEEXCL  RATE  CS5-IOD)  (3  78.03  71.8  69.83  74.93  72.9  71.93  79317
RESERVE  MONEY  (Le. S MILUONS)  52130  59420  69100  96000  112930  135E0  144840
* NETDOMESTICCREDIT  135416  191671  190681  204236  253526  204229  152610
-NETFOREIGNASSETS  -133236  -132251  -121SSI  -103236.  -140546  -68549  -7770
INVESTMENT(%GDP){2)  15.99%  17.96%  1.37%  21.35%  24.S6%  20.93%  2762%
NATIONALSAVINGS(%GDP)(2)  17.02%  19.5S%  20.51%  19.37%  3L62%  17.34%  1661%
-PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  (%  GDPP)  (2  7f96%  70.32%  69.53%  70.11%  71.70%  73.E4%  76.0S%
-GOVIERNICONSUMP11ON(%GDP)(2)  7.95%  B136%  3.99%  9.23%  10.17%  1024%  9.70%
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  DEFICITr  (1GDP) (2)  -1.02%  -1.62%  -114%  2AJ%  6.24%  3.59%  6.00%
k  BALANCE  OF PAYMENTS  SELECTED  DATA
(in mumm  or  drdas)
PIIILIPPINES  1936  1937  13  1939  199  3991  1992
RESERVES:  NEr CHNG  IN HLDGS  (3)  -1340  -144  -1010  -462  -167  -2080  -1640
SHORTTERM  CAPITAL  -1069  .246  -34  -70  350  1039  1417
LONDGTERM  CAPITAL  1073  238  -331  Sal  1227  1233  1360
POILTFOUOINVESTMENT  13  19  50  Z80  -50  310  40
NET DIRECT  INVESTMENT  127  307  936  S53  530  544  22B
CAPITALACCOUNTBALANCE  146  313  - 571  1350  2060  2930  3120
NET ERRORS  AND  OMISSIONS  33.7  67.9  493  402  593  -133  -5310
SDUce  1MP  Inlm  _na  FPudal smaics
IMF BdmredfPaymel Stashitas
Ntes  (I)An  int  in  Ikeinieis  anrpicadan  ofthe  HRE
(2)Campusedmairoupdoes.
(3)  A negv  asem_  me  a  s - iumin  ms.TABLE P
A : MACRO;CONOMiC  INDICATORS 
THAILAND  1U6  1917  3935  193g  391  19D1  19 2
AVERAGE  INFLATION(%)  1.14  2.47  36.  5.)6  5.93  5.70  4314
REALflEFCECIVDEXC"..RATECI5-I00)(1)  101.40  11014  111.50  310.52  113.67  120.5S  124.75
RESERVEMONEY(L.a.SMILUONS)  95323  130653  133994  116670  31:790  310451  243044
-NET DOMESTIC  CREDIT  24634  10529  *28613  .105913  *  174717  -254562  .2903D9
*NOT POREION  ASSETS  70644  106124  162607  26253  1360507  465013  53311)
INVESTM  rNT(%DP)  (2)  21.79%  23.92%  2#.44%  3135%  30.76%  3.1136%  3794%
NATIONAL  SAVINGS  1%  GDP)  (2)  20.33%  23.04%  32.19%  29.77%  29.9%  30.18%  32  f*%
*PRtVAT  CONSUMTIDNO  0  CDP) (23  64.42%  6341%  59.77%  59.07%  50.20%  57 40b  57.b6%
-GOVERN'T  CONSUMPTION  (4 CDP) (2)  13.20  11.76%  10.40%  9.15%  9.711%  9.F3%  470%
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  DEICrTr %  GDP)  (2)  1.46%  0.113%  0.64%  1.75%  077%  11.11`  532%
Di JIALANCE  OF PAYMENTS  SELECTED DATA
(in nuIlliomp  .fdnIIun)
THAILAND  1936  1907  19U  1939  1"9  1991  1992
RESERVES:  NET CHNO  IN HLDOS (3)  *952  *1230  *2520  *470  .3560  *4700  *2740
SHORTTERM CAPITAL  -219  461.3  2499  2323.1  5495.9  6661  53ES
LoNG TERM CAPITAL  -144  72  *263.45  3059  1330  3327  Isis
PORTFOLIOINVESTM  ENT  .29.5  346  530  1490  -33.1  *.3.1  750
NETDIRECT INVESTMENT  261.94  332  103.9  1730.3  2300  3431  1934
CAPITALACCOUNTBALANCE  -131  1060  3340  6600  9100  130D  9630
NETERRORSANDOMISSIONS  593  248  411  92E  1420  425  *23.2
S.u..  IMF.  Imnmkal  Fhrdnl  Sitdea
IW. Babes Pynmm  Smltiulca
The  Wrld Bsnk
NMmcs:  (1)  An  hocau In  d Index  oDs  ap-  dopen  ftb.RR
23  Cge"nd at  ema  polen.
(3)  A  naplve  sumber me. - lonsu  Im  n  -e  .
TABLE  1J: MAJOR  ECONOMIC  MEASURES  USED BY THE  COUNTRIES IN THE  SAMPLE
MOVETOWARDS  A MORE  FISCAL  SMitLIZATN  STERIWUZATON  RESIRlt  ON  UMERALIZATION  OP  CAPITAL  OUTFLOW
FLOATING  EXCH.  RATE  RESIRAINT  THROUGH  OPEN  THROUGH  OTHER  CAPlTALINFLOWS  Sasa  THECURRENT  LIBERAlIZAllON
ddl6nhgafihclm_.1U1ldq  (tdJecf  MARKET  . MECHANISMS S/,e  terlhdPl.minimum  ACCOUNTWCifs
daweefr,0  . prAn  mpblick  OPERATlIONS  bbusktecnaselnnnmm  mmrmmm  uumm  nducilan,c.t
go p  toabuketeor  cIndFsbe  )  Inlbm'bpAlshln  tenip  bm4.  ceUinp  on
km.bckzac  nusC.  Rblga  hnwnwi.  elt.)
ARCENINA  YES  YES
CHILE  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
COLOMNMIA  YES  YES  YES  YES
INDONESIA  YES  YES  YE  YES  YES
KOREA  YES  YES  YES
MALAYSIA  YES  YES  YES  YES
MEliCO  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
PHIUPPINES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
THAILAND  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Only  TeaaryTADLE  II
ARGKNTIWA  1SU  1717  I1o  lilt  OMN  IN  192
OVERALL  CAPITAL  ACCOUNT  BALANCE
*imilIIunor  usloin  1153  2064  1bn  *7715  1346  450S  11752
* %or.DP  1.75%  1.10%  133%  .1.01%  .0,05%  241%  5.Is%
GOVERNT  CONSUUMPTION  (% 0D03  n.m  4 90%  4.30%  4  110%  140%  1.10%  9,40%
AV  G  IMNILATION(%  9.90  1N  Il.33  342.95  I079.47  223.97  171.o7  24.90
REAL  EPPICTIVUIOXCII  RATHMrS-Ioo)  121.J1  123.39  121,47  11.44  116  23D15  210.7
CuRRIENFAcCOUNrD  PmCIT(%aGDP)  1A  1151%  0.74%  101%  .9,50%  1.44%  3.65%
aitL'  SI"  SI11117  tin  9on  lo"  1991  loll
OVERALL  CAPITAL  ACCOUNT  BALANCE
*InMliIamaofUSIDolIn  940  042.3  091  J13.7  2924  IllS  3127
* %ofGDP  5.03%  S.J9%  4.52%  5.16%  11.43%  3.30%  1.72%
OOVUPICICONEUJMMfON  (%GDP)  1251%  10.11%  1036%  9460%  9WA  9.69%  9.72%
AVRAGE INLATION(%)  19.41  19.17  14.-  17.03  21.04  21.73  15.42
REAL  II'ICTVE  MXCII  RM1r5  S-1002  14.52  71.43  73.25  7S.01  72,n4  75S15  7W.5
CURRENTACCOWNT  DWrf(%GDP)  7.34%  4.99%  0.50%  41.1%  322%  .017%  1.72%
COLOMBIA  - 14U  1J7  193s  19K  le  1991  1792
OVERALL  CAPITAL  ACCOUNT  BALANCE
-IiimiormorUSDSbi  743  50  409  5$  .54  44  4.n.
- %orrGDP  2.12%  0.9%  1.05%  I 30%  .0 14%  .1.54%  BA
GOvERITcoNsuMrnoN(%ODP)  9.11%  91m4  10.03%  1055%  1073%  90,63%  1039%
AVERAGE INFLATIONI%)  11.1111  233  J.11  25.34  29,14  30.39  27.02
REALPFETLIVEXCH.RATEDMS-100)  74,51  66.44  r4.01.  - 1.73  4.46  50.27  61.46
CURRENTACCOUNTDFICIT  (%  GDP)  2.4A%  O.13%  1.70%  . J0S3%  Z.33%  .0.13%  1.95%
INDONESIA  Is"  1957  Is  1m  1e  9991  1992
OVERALL CAPrTAL ACCOUNT BALANCE
-loMlIIInuofaUS  DulIn  2010  2727  1927  16W0  5244  5611  5745
- %orDP  - 4.64%  3.60%  1.57%  1.72%  5.03%  4,93%  4,57%
5OVERNTCONSUMPON  e%GDP ):  11.03%  942%  1.98%  9.39%  1,.92%  9,13%  9.64%
AVERAGE INFLATION(%)  5.94  9.16  3.04  6.42  7.45  9.40  7.50
REALEFFECTIVEEXCN.RATE  I5-100)  74,79  79N0  71.31  76,51  75.02  7.03  gO.59
CURRENT ACCOUNTDEFICIT(%  GOP)  5.0%  3.29x  2.41%  249  4J37%  4.07%  107%
KOREA  .179  1937  19M  1979  amO  1991  I9
OVERALL CAPITAL  ACCOJNT BALANCE
-IbMIiocadUSDol  - .4537  *s50  *4S41  .1940  960  7512  2520
- %DfGDP  .4.23%  5S11%  2.76bX  ZS9l%  0.39%  2.67%  2.73%
GOVMt?CONSUmpN1ON(%GDP)  10.06%  9J8%  9.76%  10.53%  10.69%  10.67%  11.35%
AVERAGE INFLATION 4%)  2.75  3.05  7.1S  5.7  3.5S  9.65  6.24
REALEFFECTIVEEXCf.RATH  (S-00)  104.45A  112.33  130.12  142.81  142.02  15002  141.31
CURRENTACCOUNTD  rFICIT(%  GDP)  .2.60%  4,96%  4.30%  -1.41%  1.47%  3.09%  1.40%
M^LAVSIA  199  1937  IYU  919  1990  1991  129
OVERALL CAPITAL  ACCONt  BALANCE
- l  Minliosnf  US  Dolmm  1556  950  -2263.3  1449  )5SD  577D  3340
- %efGDP  5.71%  4.75%  .6.52%  3.81%  .36%  12.21%  1.47%
GOVERWTCONSUMIPPTONE%GDP)  16.94%  15.37%  14.20%  1440%  14.01%  14.20%  13.51%
AVERAGE  INFLATION(%)  0.74  029  2.5b  2.31  2.62  4.3b  4.77
REALEFFEC11VEEXCH  RATEh(5-100)  33.94  79.55  72.16  70.37  e6.09  6609  70.26
CURRENTACCOUNTDEFICIT(%GDP)  0.53%  791X%  4.7s%  0.35%  3.39%  3.31%  2.92%TAB:I-  II  (contlnued)
MEXICO  I911  937  19  17119  t199  1991  1992
OVERALL  CAPrrAL  ACCOULNT  BALANCE
*IlMItlImuofUSDoli  ism  1610  .4200  4140  0420  29520  24540
* %hfoDP  1.23%  1.15%  .2.4U%  200%  3116  720%  7.36%
GOvERW7CONsumPnoNI%G013  9PIEFa  379%  564%  345%  it.42%  901%  1010%
AVERAGE INFLATIONC%)  16.23  131.13  114 1b  20.01  2665  221  b  15.51
PWALEFPECIVEIIXCH.IRATEfClS'IW  30.53  30.71  10076  106.43  11239  12994  14343
CURRENTACCOUNTDIPICITI%OGDP)  0.54%  .2.34%  1.61%  3.11%  2.19%%  4-76%  700%
PIIILUPPINIS  1936  1937  19U  1939  19  1991  1992
OVERALL  CAPITAL  ACCOUNT  BALANCE
inmIIIlon orUS Dolls  ISO  336  1064  1752  2hS1  2792  2610
A  %OrGDP  060%  1.16%  2.30%  4.1M2  6.03%  619%  4.97%
GOVERrTCONSUMFI1ON(%GDPI  795%  8.36%  3.99%  923%  10.17%  to24%  9.7t10
AVERAGEDNFLATIONRC)  0.75  3.79  37h  . t.21  14.14  19.71  392
REALEFPECflVEEXCH.RATE  C,tSOI)  71.03  71,11  69.t3  74.93  7290  71.03  79.87
CURMNTACCOUNTDEPICITI%AC0DP)  -1.02%  '1.62%  .2.14%  243%  624%  3.54%  6.00%
TIIAILAND  1936  I237  alp  m999  190  1991  1991
OVERALL  CAP1rAL  ACCOUNr  BALANCE
-InMIillonsaeUSDollm  467  130l  4251  7523  10520  12225  9607
- %etGDP  1.12%  2.69%  7.12%  I0.37%  13.13%  13.10%  915%
GOVERITMCONSUNMW'ON"I9  1321%  11.76%  10.40%  9.35%  9.71%  9.,5%  970%
AVERAGFEINFLATION(%)  1.U4  2.47  3.16  5.36  5.93  570  4.14
REALEFFECTIVEEXCLRATE  (S4-10)  103.4  110.14  111.50  110.52  113.67  120.56  124.75
CURRENTACCOUNTDEFICTr(%GDb)  1.46%  0.33%  0.64%.  1.75%  6.77%  3.63%  5.32%
TABLE 12
Average Capital INloWS  Trend in Government Consumption  Change in the Real Exchange Rate
19891M  (% of GDP)  (cbange  in percentage points of GDF  Index
198692)  (in % 1939-92) (1)
Thailand:  11.6%h  Dccreasing: -335  +  13%
Malysia:  9.7%  Decre;sing:  -34  - 1%
Chile:  7.5%  Decreasing  -2.9  +  6%S
Philippincs: 53%  Increasing: +1.8  +  IMP)
Mexico:  52%  lncreasing:  1.0  +  37W
Indonesia  4.1%  Decraing:  -1.4  +  5°h
Argentina:  14%  Increasing: +4.5  (2)  +  96%  (3)
Kora:  -12%h  Increasing: +1.3  +  14%(4)
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